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An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism:
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence During the
Career of Justice Scalia
LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL†
There is likely no methodological question of greater importance to constitutional law than
whether adjudication should be based on the original meaning of the Constitution’s text, or
instead reflect an evolving understanding in light of felt experience. Little effort, however, has
been made to test empirically the claim of originalists that their methodology offers an effective
vehicle for constitutional adjudication.
This study is the first to assess the extent to which original meaning, in practice, proves able to
resolve constitutional litigation. To do so, it examines Fourth Amendment jurisprudence during
the career of a self-proclaimed originalist, Justice Antonin Scalia. Cases involving the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures” were selected because stare
decisis poses no apparent obstacle to the use of originalism in this area of constitutional law,
and because the Fourth Amendment is typical of the kind of constitutional text likely to generate
litigation.
Originalism played a small role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence during the study period,
with less than 14% of the opinions of the Court addressing a disputed question of Fourth
Amendment law were originalist. Despite Justice Scalia’s professed commitment to originalism,
he voted on originalist grounds in only 18.63% of cases. The Court’s other professed originalist,
Justice Clarence Thomas, voted on originalist grounds in only 15.71% of cases. If anything, this
study’s coding methodology likely overstates the prevalence of originalism. Voting patterns were
not markedly different for Justices who do not profess fealty to originalism. These results
seemingly reflect the difficulty in applying original meaning in contemporary constitutional
adjudication, rather than a lack of commitment to originalism. This difficulty is likely
generalizable to other areas of constitutional law, and casts doubt on the utility of originalism
as an adjudicative methodology.
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INTRODUCTION
There is likely no methodological question of greater importance to
constitutional law than the question of whether adjudication should be based on
the original meaning of the Constitution’s text or, should instead reflect an
understanding of the text’s meaning that evolves over time.
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision recognizing a constitutional right
of same-sex couples to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges.1 The opinion of the Court
advanced a classic argument for an evolving understanding of constitutional
law; after observing that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not always see
it in our own times,” Justice Kennedy wrote:
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the
right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.2

In his dissent, Justice Scalia offered a classic originalist response: “When
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to
one man and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so.
That resolves these cases.”3
The debate is a familiar one. Originalist objections have appeared in
dissenting opinions in virtually every instance in recent decades in which the
Court recognized constitutional rights unknown when the Constitution was
framed.4 Originalist arguments, however, are not confined to dissenting
opinions; they have often appeared in opinions of the Court rejecting efforts to
expand the scope of constitutional rights beyond those that have been
historically recognized.5 Conversely, on other occasions, originalism has been

1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Id. at 2598. This passage echoes what may be the paradigmatic statement of an evolving understanding
of the Constitution:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United
States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in
the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
3. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595–98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disputing
recognition of a right to engage in private, same-sex sexual acts); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173–76 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contesting the recognition of a right to abortion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
376–85 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the claim that the death penalty violates the Constitution).
5. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818–20 (2014) (rejecting the claim that the
Establishment Clause prohibits legislative prayer); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722–28 (1997)
(rejecting a claimed right to assisted suicide); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
194–97 (1989) (rejecting the claim that a child had a right to be protected from his abusive father).
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employed to expand the scope of constitutional protections.6
The case for originalism is familiar as well. Originalism is frequently
defended on the ground that any legal text is properly understood based on its
meaning when framed.7 Its advocates also argue that originalism appropriately
constrains judicial power by confining constitutional adjudication to the legal
meaning of text,8 and reflects the proper role of the judiciary by leaving the
making of constitutional law to those who framed and ratified constitutional
text.9 Moreover, originalism is said to lead to desirable outcomes by protecting
legal commitments that reflect fundamental values.10
Scientific theories gain acceptance when they generate hypotheses that are
later tested and borne out; surely legal theories deserve testing as well.11 Yet,

6. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting
the possession of handguns in the home and requiring handguns be locked when not being used); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (invalidating under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause a rule of
evidence permitting the use of out-of-court statements reflecting adequate indicia of reliability).
7. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35–37 (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 102–11 (rev. ed. 2014); GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 67–90 (1992); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 160–212
(1999); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1001, 1103–07 (1991); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550–59 (1994); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–1259 (1987); Christopher R. Green, “This
Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1607, 1641–57 (2009); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229–36 (1988); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–48
(2003); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997); Michael
W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278–87 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to
Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2056–62 (2006); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original
Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (1988); Saikrishna
B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541–45 (1998); Lawrence B.
Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 38–42 (2011).
8. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 111–15; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW
OR POLITICS? 31–38 (1994); WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 50–61; Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and
Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 288–91 (1996); Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting”
the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1020–29 (1992); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104,
105–06 (1989); Solum, supra note 7, at 42–44.
9. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 54–56; ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143–60 (1990); WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 152–59; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121–26 (1998); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism,
Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440, 1444–46 (2007); Jonathan R.
Macey, Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 307–08 (1996); Michael W. McConnell,
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132–37 (1998); Stephen E. Sachs,
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 844–58 (2015).
10. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL D. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION
62–99 (2013); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82–88 (2009).
11. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 DENV. U. L.
REV. 661, 668 (1998) (“In most fields, a theory has to be testable; it is a hypothesis, a prediction, and therefore

December 2018]

AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF ORIGINALISM

79

little effort has been made to test the hypotheses generated by originalism. After
all, whether originalism produces its claimed virtues is ultimately an empirical
question. If the case for originalism is sound, one should be able to demonstrate
that originalism constrains judicial discretion by providing a basis in the
demonstrable original meaning of constitutional text for resolving disputed
questions of constitutional law in the broad range of cases that come before the
courts. As one leading originalist scholar put it, original meaning has utility in
constitutional adjudication “only to the extent that this meaning can be
ascertained and applied to a case or controversy.”12 If, however, originalism
yields no answer in most cases, resort to other modalities of adjudication is
inescapable, and originalism’s ability to deliver on its asserted virtues would be
compromised.
Whether originalism produces its theorized virtues is hotly disputed.
Nonoriginalists argue that the constitutional text most likely to generate
litigation is framed at such a high level of generality that the original meaning
of constitutional text offers little useful guidance.13 Even many originalist
scholars acknowledge that the original meaning of constitutional text is
sometimes vague or ambiguous, necessitating resort to what they characterize as
nonoriginalist construction.14 Others, in contrast, reject the need for
nonoriginalist construction contending instead that textual vagueness or
ambiguity can be addressed through the same methods that were employed at
the time constitutional text was originally framed.15 This claim, as well,
generates a testable hypothesis—that original methods can resolve textual
vagueness and ambiguity and thereby facilitate adjudication on originalist
grounds even in the face of seemingly vague or ambiguous constitutional text.16

subject to proof. When legal scholars use the word ‘theory,’ they seem to mean (most of the time) something
they consider deep, original, and completely untestable.”).
12. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 257, 263 (2005).
13. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 7–10, 18–19 (2010); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL
C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31–64 (1991); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New
Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 725–27 (2011); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism
Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 432–33 (1998); Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and NonOriginalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 716–24 (2011); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth
Doing . . ., 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 539, 549–50, 566–67 (2016).
14. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 7, at 14, 31–32; BARNETT, supra note 7, at 120–31; WHITTINGTON, supra
note 7, at 5–14; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
467–72 (2013); Grégoire C. N. Webber, Originalism’s Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 147, 173–76 (Grant Huscraft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
15. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 116–53; Sachs, supra note 9, at 874–83.
16. Cf. ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 118 (2018) (“Throughout the book, the authors claim that
these original methods will reduce the vagueness and imprecision of much of the constitutional text, but nowhere
do they show how that would work in practice. Their project suffers from the absence of applying theory to facts
because simply alleging that originalist rules and methods will make the judicial case deciding function easier,
without showing how that is true, makes their claim hard to evaluate.”).
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There have been a handful of scholarly efforts to examine the use of
originalism in constitutional adjudication.17 This small body of research,
however, does not endeavor to determine how often judicial decisions, or the
votes of individual judges, turn on original meaning. This study is the first to
undertake that task, and thereby, to assess the extent to which originalism, in
practice, proves able to constrain constitutional adjudication. To do so, this study
examines Fourth Amendment jurisprudence during the career of self-proclaimed
originalist Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia’s career lasted long enough to
supply a large, but manageable, set of Fourth Amendment decisions; moreover,
cases involving the constitutional prohibition on “unreasonable searches and
seizures”18 were selected because stare decisis poses no apparent obstacle to the
use of originalism in this area of constitutional adjudication.19 Fourth
Amendment cases during Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court, therefore,
represent a good opportunity to test the hypothesis that originalism provides a
workable methodology for constitutional adjudication, even when constitutional
text is framed at a relatively high level of generality.
Part I explicates the methodology of the present study, including its
definition of originalism and approach to coding opinions. If anything, the
coding methodology utilized in this study likely overstates the prevalence of
originalism. Part II presents the results, which indicate that originalism played a
small role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: less than 14% of the opinions
of the Court during Justice Scalia’s service were originalist. A Justice’s
methodological commitments made little apparent difference; despite Justice
Scalia’s professed commitment to originalism, he voted on originalist grounds
in only 18.63% of cases addressing disputed questions of Fourth Amendment
law. The Court’s other professed originalist, Justice Clarence Thomas, voted on
originalist grounds in only 15.71% of cases. Voting patterns were not markedly
different for Justices with different methodological commitments. Part III
analyzes these results and suggests that they reflect neither a lack of commitment
to originalism nor the influence of nonoriginalist precedent, but instead the
difficulties in applying original meaning in contemporary constitutional
adjudication. Part IV considers alternatives to Justice Scalia’s approach to
originalism that might increase the rate of originalist adjudication, and concludes
that none are very promising.
I. METHODOLOGY
There are formidable methodological issues in studying the role of
originalism in constitutional adjudication: originalism must be defined, a
suitable dataset must be identified, and an approach must be developed for

17. This research is summarized in Subpart I.C below.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. The compatibility between Fourth Amendment originalism and stare decisis is explored in Subpart I.B
below.
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coding opinions.
A. DEFINING ORIGINALISM
Determining what qualifies as originalist constitutional adjudication is no
easy matter. Some originalist scholars, for example, contend that the Framers’
intent should be the focus of constitutional interpretation.20 Others reject inquiry
into authorial intentions, and instead, treat the manner in which the Framing-era
public would have understood the text as binding.21 Still others focus on how a
hypothetical reasonable person in the Framing era would have understood the
text.22 This brief summary, however, considerably understates the diversity of
thinking among originalists; Thomas Colby and Peter Smith’s survey of
originalist methodology, for example, identified a dizzying array of
approaches.23
Nevertheless, there are some conceptual commonalities in the various
originalist methodologies. Lawrence Solum has written:
Contemporary originalism is . . . united by two core ideas, fixation and constraint.
The Fixation Thesis claims the original meaning (“communicative content”) of
the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified.
The Constraint Principle claims that constitutional actors (e.g., judges, officials,
and citizens) ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they engage
in constitutional practice (paradigmatically deciding constitutional cases).24

Professor Solum’s account nicely sketches the boundaries of originalism:
absent fixation (like Professor Solum, I use the phrase “original meaning” to
denote fixation) and constraint, the legal meaning of the Constitution is capable
of evolution. Indeed, this account seems consistent with the views of virtually
all originalists, who consistently endorse some version of fixation and
constraint.25
20. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540–42
(2013); Kay, supra note 7, at 229–36; Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely)
Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 194–99 (2010).
21. See BORK, supra note 9, at 144–51; Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
405, 410–16 (2007); Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 663, 668–72 (2009); Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional
Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 271–79 (2002); Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory,
18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 411–15 (2009); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”:
Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates
Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 972–80 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47,
51–70 (2006).
23. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–62 (2009).
24. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015) (footnotes omitted).
25. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.”); Keith E.
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (“Originalism regards the
discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of
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There is one possible dissent to this account. William Baude has argued for
an “inclusive originalism,” which, although it treats “the original meaning of the
Constitution as the ultimate criterion for constitutional law,” also permits
consideration of “precedent, policy, or practice, but only to the extent that the
original meaning incorporates or permits them.”26 Professor Baude claims that
virtually all constitutional jurisprudence is originalist in this sense, writing that
“the Court never contradicts originalism. Indeed, the canonical cases that are
most frequently invoked as examples of anti-originalism are actually
reconcilable with originalism.”27
Critics have charged that this account of inclusive originalism is so
inclusive as to make originalism virtually meaningless.28 Yet, Professor Baude’s
qualification that nonoriginalist considerations are appropriate when permitted
by original meaning crucially limits his claim. Professor Baude acknowledges
that nonoriginalist methods of construction are inescapable when the
Constitution’s original meaning is vague or ambiguous, and that nonoriginalist
precedent is binding to the extent that the original meaning of the Constitution
was thought to embrace reliance on precedent.29 Accordingly, Professor Baude’s
position does not differ from that of other originalists who argue that
nonoriginalist construction is sometimes necessary.30
To the extent, however, that Professor Baude treats decisions as originalist
merely because they do not purport to reject original meaning, his approach is
problematic. A claim that decisions of the Supreme Court do not depart from the
original meaning of the Constitution, after all, is quite different from a claim that
these decisions rest on the original meaning of constitutional text fixed at the
time of framing and ratification. If, for example, the original meaning of
constitutional text is vague or ambiguous as applied to most cases, then original
meaning is incapable of deciding them. Resort to nonoriginalism becomes

constitutional interpretation in the present.”). Stephen Sachs has offered a qualification, arguing that originalism
requires only a commitment to legal rules fixed in the past, even if not contained in a written text. Stephen E.
Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 157–59 (2017). For present purposes, the case for nontextual originalism is immaterial because this study focuses on the original meaning of text—the Fourth
Amendment. As we will see, however, Fourth Amendment originalism often includes a commitment to framingera legal practice not necessarily reflected in the Fourth Amendment’s text, and therefore this Article’s
methodology is consistent with Professor Sachs’s view of originalism.
26. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355, 2356–63 (2015).
27. Id. at 2371; see also William Baude, Adam S. Chilton, and Anup Malani, Making Doctrinal Work More
Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 55–57 (2017) (undertaking a systematic
review of Supreme Court opinions and finding them “consistent with” inclusive originalism as defined by
Baude). But cf. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 107–08 (2016)
(opining that a substantial body of constitutional doctrine may be incompatible with originalism).
28. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS AND
AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 15–19 (2015); SEGALL, supra note 16, at 104–15; Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1657–58 (2016); Richard A. Posner, What Is Obviously Wrong with the Federal
Judiciary, Yet Eminently Curable, Part II, 19 GREEN BAG 2d 257, 264 n.12 (2016).
29. Baude, supra note 26, at 2357–61.
30. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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inescapable.
Consider Professor Baude’s claim that the holding in Brown v. Board of
Education31—that racial segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth
Amendment—can be reconciled with original meaning.32 Perhaps this is so, but
the Brown opinion states that the historical evidence before the Court regarding
“the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
including evidence relating to the “exhaustive[] consideration of the
Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in
racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the
Amendment,” were nevertheless “not enough to resolve the problem with which
we are faced,” being “[a]t best . . . inconclusive.”33 In light of this express denial
that its decision rested on the historical evidence of original meaning, surely
Brown cannot be characterized as a decision reflecting no more than fixation and
constraint. That a decision may be “reconcilable” with originalism does not
establish that historical evidence of the original meaning of constitutional text
played any meaningful role in producing it. Especially when the original
meaning of constitutional text is framed at a high level of generality, a great
many holdings may be reconcilable with originalism, but some other
adjudicative modality is nevertheless required to pick among them.34
Accordingly, one cannot treat an opinion as originalist when it makes no
claim to rest on the meaning of the Constitution as fixed at the framing, at least
if one wishes to determine as an empirical matter the frequency at which
originalism produces outcomes in constitutional adjudication. Therefore,
Professor Baude’s account of inclusive originalism cannot address the empirical
question of concern here. To determine the rate at which originalism produces
answers to disputed questions of constitutional law that come before the courts,
inquiry is required into whether a judicial resolution of a disputed question of

31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See Baude, supra note 26, at 2380–81 (“Brown spends several pages at the very beginning of the
opinion fighting the original-meaning question to a draw” and accordingly “nothing in Brown’s official
canonicity contradicts originalism’s legal status.”).
33. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489. For what is likely the leading originalist defense of Brown that relies primarily
on the substantial support for efforts to end segregation during Reconstruction, see Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). For a powerful response that, among
other things, notes that legally-imposed racial segregation remained common, even in the North, after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional
Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995). If the Fourteenth Amendment’s
original meaning forbade governmentally-imposed racial segregation, it is surely odd that the Fourteenth
Amendment had so little demonstrable impact on the prevalence of segregation during the period in which its
original meaning should have been apparent throughout the nation that had just ratified the Amendment.
34. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, This Essay Is Brilliant/This Essay Is Stupid: Positive and Negative SelfReference in Constitutional Practice and Theory, 46 UCLA L. REV. 501, 550 (1998) (“If originalism never
requires judges to reach results that they would not reach using some other theory, it does no independent work
and can be reduced to the rival theory that is in fact determining outcomes.”).
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law reflects fixation and constraint.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
To assess the extent to which originalism is used as the basis for
constitutional adjudication, this study focuses on Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence during Justice Scalia’s career on the United States Supreme Court.
Throughout that time, Justice Scalia professed adherence to the original meaning
of the Constitution as the basis for constitutional adjudication.35 Justice Scalia
embraced originalism as defined above; he described originalism as an example
of what he called the “Fixed Meaning Canon.”36 Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s
career presents an opportunity to study the jurisprudence of a committed
originalist.
1.

Originalism and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

A study of originalist adjudication may be confounded by the doctrine of
stare decisis. Although some originalist scholars argue that originalism requires
repudiation of nonoriginalist precedent,37 others believe that at least some types
of nonoriginalist precedent deserve deference.38 Justice Scalia was (mostly) in
the latter camp: in his extrajudicial writings, he expressed reluctance to repudiate
nonoriginalist precedent,39 although there were occasions on which he did so.40

35. See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (opinion of the Court delivered by Scalia, J.); Minnesota v. Dickerson 508
U.S. 366, 379–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962–85 (1991) (opinion
of Scalia, J.); see also Antonin Scalia, Foreword, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871, 871 (2008) (“Twenty years
ago, when I joined the Supreme Court, I was the only originalist among its numbers.”).
36. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 78–92. To similar effect, see Scalia, supra note 8, at 862–64.
37. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 262–69; Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 948–51 (2008); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against
Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 13–22 (2007); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically
Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 298 (2005).
38. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 154–74 (arguing that the original meaning of the
Constitution contemplates that federal courts will employ a doctrine of precedent); Baude, supra note 26, at
2358–61 (same); Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105, 121–
47 (2015) (arguing that precedent can be used in the face of uncertainty about original meaning); Lash, supra
note 9, at 1444–61 (arguing for deference to precedents that enhance popular sovereignty); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 739–72 (1988) (arguing that
some precedents are too entrenched in constitutional adjudication to be repudiated); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis
and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 5–50 (2001) (arguing that reliance on precedent as
a method of addressing legal indeterminacy is rooted in Framing-era understandings); Lee J. Strang, An
Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L.
REV. 419, 436–79 (2006) (arguing that nonoriginalist precedent should be preserved if its repudiation would
produce serious costs).
39. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 87, 411–14; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129–40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
40. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556–65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to apply
precedents regarding congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment outside the context of racial
discrimination); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–68 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980)); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 447–50, 461–65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating
that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) be overruled); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
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One could speculate that, at least in some cases, Justice Scalia may have failed
to employ originalism in his jurisprudence out of deference to nonoriginalist
precedent.41
To avoid this problem, this study examines Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In this area, there is good reason to believe that stare decisis posed
no obstacle to originalist adjudication. In fact, originalism has deep roots in
Fourth Amendment precedent.
As early as Boyd v. United States,42 “the first Fourth Amendment case of
real consequence,”43 the Court wrote that “to ascertain the nature of the
proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the
terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’” it was necessary to consider the
Framing-era “history of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and
in England.”44 The Court then held that an order directing an importer to produce
records relating to a shipment that had been seized for forfeiture was inconsistent
with the Framing-era rule forbidding a search of private papers except when
authorized by a valid warrant.45 Subsequently, in the landmark decision of
Carroll v. United States,46 the Court, citing Boyd, wrote: “The Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable

833, 996–1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (advocating that Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) be overruled).
41. Some regarded Justice Scalia’s willingness to adhere to nonoriginalist precedent, as well as his
skepticism about enforcing constitutional text that does not yield clear and readily administrable rules or that
generates what seem to be perverse results, as important deviations from originalism. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett,
Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 10–14 (2006). We will
see, however, that nonoriginalist precedent and the absence of readily-administrable rules posed little apparent
obstacle to originalism in Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As for problematic results, Justice
Scalia once acknowledged: “[I]n a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any
more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging. But then I cannot
imagine such a case’s arising either.” Scalia, supra note 8, at 864. Not only does this passage make clear that
Justice Scalia did not regard it as likely that he would confront a case in which originalism produced an extreme
result, but we will also see that there is no evident example of this problem infecting his Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. It is worth noting that Justice Scalia eventually repudiated his self-characterization as a “fainthearted originalist,” claiming that he adhered to originalism regardless of consequences. See Jennifer Senior, In
Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/ features/antonin-scalia-201310.
42. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
43. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49 (1966).
44. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624–25.
45. Id. at 625–30.
46. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For a helpful discussion of the importance of Carroll to the subsequent
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The
Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 121–28
(2010).
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search and seizure when it was adopted . . . .”47 The Court then undertook an
analysis of the law governing customs searches of ships and their cargo in the
wake of the Fourth Amendment’s framing, and concluded that a warrantless
search of an automobile based on probable cause to believe it contained
contraband was consistent with the original understanding of search and seizure
authority.48 Three years later, in Olmstead v. United States,49 the Court, after
observing that “[t]he well known historical purpose of the Fourth
Amendment . . . was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s
house, his person, his papers, and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against
his will,”50 held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by wiretapping
undertaken to intercept telephonic conversations absent “actual physical
invasion of [a] house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”51
Thus, originalism has long been employed in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. To be sure, by the 1960s, the Court was less hospitable to Fourth
Amendment originalism. For example, in Katz v. United States,52 making no
reference to any historical evidence of the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court repudiated Olmstead and held that warrantless
wiretapping of a telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment, reasoning:
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”53 The next Term, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court rejected the view that
“the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest
and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of
the Fourth Amendment,” 54 and concluded that the constitutional reasonableness
of a contested search or seizure should be assessed by “balancing the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”55 On
that basis, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment permitted the brief
detention and frisk of a suspect for weapons based on reasonable suspicion,
rather than the traditional standard of probable cause.56
Nevertheless, originalism did not disappear from Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In United States v. Watson,57 the Court relied on the prevailing
common-law rule in the Framing era to hold that warrantless arrests in public
places based on probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed an

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 149–53.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 463.
Id. at 466.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968).
Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)).
Id. at 27.
423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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offense are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.58 In Oliver v. United
States,59 the Court concluded that nothing in Katz’s privacy-based approach
required abandonment of the rule that the protection of the Fourth Amendment
“is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the
house is as old as the common law.”60 The Court reasoned that “the common
law implies, as we reaffirm today, that no expectation of privacy legitimately
attaches to open fields.”61 In this fashion, the Court reconciled its doctrinal
innovation in Katz with Framing-era understandings about the reach of the
Fourth Amendment.
The effort to reconcile originalism with Katz became even more apparent
in Kyllo v. United States.62 When considering whether the use of a thermal
imaging device to locate the sources of heat in a home was an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion of the Court, which, while acknowledging that the Court’s “Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass,” added: “It would
be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”63
Accordingly, he reasoned:
[T]here is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police
technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. . . . This
assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.64

Kyllo is hardly the only example of the persistence of Fourth Amendment
originalism. For instance, in Wilson v. Arkansas, in the course of holding that
the common-law requirement that an officer knock and announce his authority
before making a forcible entry to execute a warrant was an aspect of reasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Court wrote that to identify
Fourth Amendment protections, “[W]e have looked to the traditional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the
time of the framing.”65 Subsequently, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the
Court in Wyoming v. Houghton,66 in which he echoed Wilson’s originalist
methodology: “In determining whether a particular governmental action violates

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 418–24.
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Id. at 176 (quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
Id. at 180.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 31, 33–34.
Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (citations omitted).
526 U.S. 295 (1999).
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the [Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an
unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed.”67
Thus, the evidence suggests that the force of precedent posed no apparent
obstacle to the use of originalism in Fourth Amendment adjudication.68
2.

Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment Originalism

Houghton provides a useful illustration of Justice Scalia’s Fourth
Amendment originalism. Justice Scalia never claimed that the semantic meaning
of the terms “search” or “seizure” had changed since the Framing-era. On the
occasions in which he discussed the original meaning of those terms, Justice
Scalia utilized definitions consistent with contemporary parlance.69 In this sense,
the Fourth Amendment may be typical of the Constitution’s text, as John
Harrison observed: “Reading the Constitution or the Federalist Papers or
accounts of debates from the 1790s is not like reading Chaucer or even
Shakespeare. Madison did not live in our time, but he did speak our language.”70
67. Id. at 299.
68. Cf. Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1671, 1699–1713 (2015) (identifying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an area in which
typical voting alignments on the Supreme Court tend not to hold and suggesting that Justices’ varying
methodological commitments to “legalism” or “pragmatism” explains this pattern).
69. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.1 (2001) (“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to
‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by
inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.’” (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989)); California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (“From the time of the founding to the present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking
possession,’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).
70. John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 94
(2003). In this respect, it is illuminating to consider the examples of “linguistic drift” in the meaning of
constitutional terms since the Framing era offered by Professor Solum, who has advanced what is likely the most
fully theorized account of originalism. First, he observed that the constitutional obligation of the United States
to “protect” the states “against domestic violence,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 4, reflects an evolution in
meaning since the phrase “domestic violence” has acquired a new meaning unknown during the framing era.
Solum, supra note 24, at 16–17. Yet, as nonoriginalist scholars have observed, most contemporary readers of
the Constitution would grasp from its context that the Constitution’s reference to “domestic violence” connotes
civil unrest and not violence between intimates. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 2011, 2044 (2012) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 7 & STRAUSS, supra note 13); Martin H. Redish &
Matthew B. Arnold, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a
“Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1529–30 (2012). Second, Professor Solum suggested
that the constitutional prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend VIII, might have
been understood in the Framing era to refer not to punishments that are rarely employed as in contemporary
parlance, but instead as “a term of art that referred to governmental practices that are contrary to ‘long usage’ or
‘immemorial usage.’” Solum, supra note 24, at 74 (quoting John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008)). It is
unclear, however, if this establishes linguistic drift, or merely textual ambiguity. Contemporary, no less than
Framing-era, speakers might use the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” to connote punishments regarded
as archaic, even if they might also use it to refer to punishments that are rarely administered. It is, moreover,
doubtful that the Framing-era understanding was free from ambiguity; the only discussion of the phrase on the
floor of the House of Representatives as it considered what became the Eighth Amendment came from two
representatives who complained that the proposal was vague, and might prohibit then-common punishments,
including hanging. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 261 n.3, 261–64 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. 16
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Nor did Justice Scalia attempt to illuminate original meaning by reference to the
history of the drafting and ratification of the Fourth Amendment, perhaps
because that history contains little discussion aside from expressions of concern
about general warrants unsupported by any particularized showing or
authorization.71
Instead, as in Houghton, Justice Scalia relied primarily on Framing-era
practice to illustrate the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.72 Justice
Scalia believed there was good reason to consult Framing-era practice in order
to ascertain original meaning, even for constitutional text that is framed in
“abstract and general rather than specific and concrete” terms, since “[t]he
context suggests that the abstract and general terms, like the concrete and
particular ones, are meant to nail down current rights, rather than aspire after
future ones—that they are abstract and general references to extant rights and
freedoms possessed under the then-current regime.”73 He later added that the
Constitution “employ[ed] general terms such as due process, equal protection,
[and] cruel and unusual punishments. What these generalities meant as applied
to many phenomena that existed at the time of their adoption was well
understood and accepted.”74
By using historical evidence of the Framing-era understanding of lawful
search or seizure, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism utilized
contextual evidence to identify the meaning of the unreasonable searches and
seizures as fixed in the Framing era, rather than assessing reasonableness by
reference to contemporary understandings. In this sense, Justice Scalia’s Fourth
Amendment originalism differed from nonoriginalist textualism; he read the
Fourth Amendment through the lens of historical context, rather than utilizing
its contemporary meaning. This approach is no outlier; there is widespread
agreement among originalists that original meaning is illuminated by contextual
evidence of the Framing-era understanding.75 Many originalist scholars have
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 379, 381 (John P. Kaminiski & Gaspare
J. Saladino eds., 1986) (“The expressions ‘unusual and severe,’ or ‘cruel and unusual,’ surely would have been
too vague to have been of any consequence, since they admit of no clear and precise signification.”). In any
event, even if there has been linguistic drift with respect to some terms found in this Constitution, Professor
Solum has not endeavored to demonstrate that this is a common phenomenon in constitutional interpretation.
71. For a helpful account of the drafting and ratification history, see WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 602–1791, at 691–98, 712–23 (2009).
72. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) (“We look to the statutes and common law of
the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.”).
73. Scalia, supra note 39, at 135.
74. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 85.
75. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 414
(2013) (“[T]o ascertain the original public meaning of the text, the New Originalism looks to the publicly
available communicative context of these words to resolve problems of ambiguity.”); Kay, supra note 7, at 241
(“[L]anguage [i]s part of the means employed by individuals to accomplish their objectives. Our job in trying to
understand language is to discern those objectives. We can accomplish this only by participating in, or
investigating, the system of conventions people use in a given time and place and by considering the likelihood
of various objectives in light of the particular circumstances in which language is used—that is, by considering
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also argued that Framing-era practice provides important contextual evidence
that helpfully fleshes out the original meaning of constitutional text.76 Others
have added that emerging computer-assisted techniques involving “corpus
linguistics” facilitate inquiry into original meaning by enabling Framing-era
linguistic datasets to be analyzed to determine the manner and context in which
constitutional text was most often employed.77
Although Justice Scalia never discussed the original meaning of the term
“unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment, there is reason to believe that its
original meaning offers support for his focus on Framing-era practice and usage
when undertaking Fourth Amendment originalism. While David Sklansky’s
review of the historical evidence convinced him that in the Framing era, the
term “unreasonable” meant “what it means today: contrary to sound judgment,
inappropriate, or excessive,”78 Laura Donohue has argued that, at least in legal

the ‘context’ of the particular utterance.” (footnote omitted)); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA.
L. REV. 659, 674 (1987) (“[T]o translate the founders’ thought we need to do more than construct a lexicon of
late eighteenth- or mid-nineteenth-century political terms. We must also locate the cultural context that gave
their constitutional views meaning and urgency.”); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875
(1992) (“[T]he federal constitution should be interpreted in accordance with originalist textualism, understood
as a method which searches for the ordinary public meanings that the Constitution’s words, read in linguistic,
structural, and historical context, had at the time of those words’ origin.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist
Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 285 (2017) (“Bare semantic meanings are sparse. Lawyers are very
familiar with the idea that the literal meaning of a text does not deliver the full contextual meaning. This point
is related to the notion that the semantic content of a constitutional provision may underdetermine its legal
effect . . . . Some of this underdeterminacy may be resolved by context . . . .”); Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin’s
“Originalism”: The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 212 (2000)
(“[H]istorical material is ‘not merely relevant to,’ but is required by the search for textual meaning. One cannot
accurately interpret my descriptive statement, ‘the children are playing,’ if one does not also realize that ‘the
children’ refers to my pet dogs. Likewise, one cannot understand the requirements of the due process clause, or
recognize that the equal protection clause does not require wealth redistribution, without understanding the
historical context and background of the clause, even if it does not amount to a legal term of art.”).
76. See Kay, supra note 7, at 253; Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1627, 1654–55 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–81 (2007); Smith, supra note 20, at 194–99; Strang, supra
note 21, at 964–73; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of
War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 172–74 (1996); cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–39 (2003) (arguing that post-enactment practice can shed important
light on original meaning).
77. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 75, at 284 (“The evidence provided by corpus linguistics is primary
evidence of the patterns of usage themselves, whereas dictionary definitions and linguistic intuitions are
secondary evidence. Corpus linguistics enables the use of quantitative methods and hence minimizes the role of
subjective, qualitative judgments.”); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological
Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1205
(2017) (“The originalist will identify and catalogue uses of the term uncovered by CART [computer-assisted
research techniques], and then, from the text’s immediate context, ascertain the language convention (if any)
employed.”).
78. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1780
(2000). To similar effect, see DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 160–61
(2017).
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contexts, the term meant “going outside the boundaries of a settled rule,”79 and
Thomas Davies concluded that it “meant searches and seizures that were
inherently illegal at common law.”80 These latter definitions suggest that the
Fourth Amendment’s original meaning is hospitable to Justice Scalia’s
approach; the prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures” may well
have incorporated prevailing legal understandings about the lawful reach of
governmental search and seizure authority.81
Application of Framing-era search and seizure to contemporary search and
seizure litigation, however, can pose difficulties. Scholars frequently argue that
when the context in which Framing-era doctrine developed has changed,
continued application of Framing-era rules may become problematic.82 For
example, although the Court correctly noted in Olmstead that in the Framing era,
the Fourth Amendment regulated only “an actual physical invasion . . . for the
purpose of making a seizure,”83 in the Framing-era there was little ability for the
government to intrude upon the privacy of the home absent a physical invasion.
For this reason, application of the Framing-era rule to modern methods of
electronic surveillance could well prove unfaithful to the Framing-era
conception of the Fourth Amendment as a limitation on the government’s
investigative authority.84
Justice Scalia was sensitive to this problem. He cautioned that
constitutional interpretation should be based on “semantic intention” and not
“the concrete expectations of lawgivers.”85 In this sense, he echoed the views of
most originalist scholars, who argue that only the original meaning of
constitutional text, and not the manner in which that text was to be applied in
the Framing era, should be regarded as binding.86 Kyllo provides a good

79. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1275 (2016) (emphasis
removed).
80. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 693 (1999).
81. Cf. William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1821, 1827–41 (2016) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s Framing-era history suggests concern with
protecting extant legal rights regarding search and seizure).
82. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 10–16, 75–81; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291–94 (1996); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1804–10 (1997); Mark
D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 591–617 (1998); Stephen
M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1205–08; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1169–71 (1993).
83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
84. For a helpful discussion of this point that touches on wiretapping, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367–79 (1997).
85. Scalia, supra note 39, at 144.
86. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 6–14; Barnett, supra note 21, at 410; Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism
and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385–89 (2007);
Calabresi & Fine, supra note 21, at 668–72; Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference
Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 580–82 (2006); McConnell, supra note 7, at 1284–87; Paulsen, supra note
7, at 2059–62; James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L.
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example. In that case, as we have seen, Justice Scalia rejected the Framing-era
understanding that search and seizure involved some form of physical intrusion
in favor of what he regarded as an underlying Framing-era baseline protection
of privacy embedded within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.87
“The purpose of the [Fourth Amendment],” he wrote in another case, “is to
preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of
their property that existed when the provision was adopted—even if a later, less
virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion
‘reasonable.’”88
Justice Scalia’s sensitivity to changes in context was not confined to
technological advances, it included attention to other contextual evidence that
might render reliance on Framing-era rules suspect. For example, in Georgia v.
Randolph,89 Justice Scalia, in his separate opinion responding to the claim that
under the Framing-era law of property a wife had no legal right to authorize a
search of property owned by her husband, wrote:
There is nothing new or surprising in the proposition that our unchanging
Constitution refers to other bodies of law that might themselves change. . . . No
one supposes that the meaning of the Constitution changes as States expand and
contract property rights. If it is indeed true, therefore, that a wife in 1791 could
not authorize the search of her husband’s house, the fact that current property law
provides otherwise is no more troublesome for the originalist than the wellestablished fact that a State must compensate its takings of even those property
rights that did not exist at the time of the founding.90

Thus, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is sensitive to altered
historical contexts.
In sum, given the scope and sophistication of Justice Scalia’s Fourth
Amendment originalism, and the lack of any apparent precedential obstacle to
the use of originalism in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Scalia’s
work in this area provides an excellent opportunity to examine the behavior of a
committed originalist jurist, and contrast his record to that of other members of
the Court as they decided the same cases.91

REV. 1523, 1539–46 (2011); Solum, supra note 24, at 48–55.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
88. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
90. Id. at 144 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. For a largely favorable assessment of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism, see Timothy C.
MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment: Text, Context, Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted
Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 175 (2015). For more critical assessments, see Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer,
The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1235–45 (2015); M. Blane Michael, Reading the
Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 912–19 (2010); and
Sklansky, supra note 78, at 1775–813.
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C. CODING OPINIONS
Developing a method to code opinions as either originalist or nonoriginalist
presents difficulties. As Frank Cross, who undertook what is likely the most
comprehensive effort to date to measure the prevalence of originalism in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, observed, “Originalism is difficult to measure.
In theory, one might read every opinion of the Court and assess its fealty to the
originalist method. This approach is unrealistically difficult, though, and would
also suffer from the subjective biases of the assessor.”92
Presumably to avoid the potential for subjectivity in coding, most scholars
who have endeavored to measure the prevalence of originalism have used
references to historical evidence of original meaning in judicial opinions as a
proxy for originalism. Professor Cross, for example, coded opinions that refer to
The Federalist, the materials on the ratification of the original Constitution in
Elliot’s Debates, the Farrand compilation of Madison’s notes on the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Framing-era dictionaries, and the
Declaration of Independence as originalist.93 Others who have attempted to
measure the prevalence of originalism have used a similar approach.94 These
studies have consistently found that the use of originalist evidence did not
predict the manner in which Members of the Court voted, suggesting that
originalism is largely used as a pretext to mask ideological preferences.95
This approach avoids the dangers of subjectivity, but it has a critical
weakness; it does not assess the extent to which a Justice’s vote rested on
whatever evidence of original meaning may be referenced in an opinion.
Professor Cross, for example, concluded that his study showed that “originalist
sources are simply used to ‘decorate’ opinions reached on other grounds.”96 Yet,
judicial insincerity is not the only conceivable explanation for studies that find
that the use of originalist evidence does not predict Justices’ votes. A

92. FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 120 (2013).
93. Id. at 120–25.
94. See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley et al., The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist
Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 329–33 (2005) (surveying court citations to the Federalist Papers); Mathew J.
Festa, Dueling Federalists: Supreme Court Decisions with Multiple Opinions Citing The Federalist, 1986–2007,
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 93–95 (2007) (same); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at
Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 121–26 (2002) (reviewing parties’ briefs and identifying claims based
on the intent of the Framers); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Convention, 27 J.L.
& POL. 63, 70–71 (2011) (identifying references to the Constitutional Convention in opinions and briefs); Peter
J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 217, 251–56 (2004) (identifying statements of Framing-era views on federalism in opinions addressing
federalism issues).
95. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 92, at 173–89; Festa, supra note 94, at 99–103; Howard & Segal, supra
note 94, at 126–34; Smith, supra note 94, at 256–86; see also Corley et al., supra note 94, at 335–38 (finding
that citations to The Federalist Papers are driven by both attitudinal and tactical considerations); cf. Sirico, supra
note 94, at 76–77 (finding that ideology did not predict a Justice’s references to the Constitutional Convention).
96. CROSS, supra note 92, at 188.
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methodology that asks only whether an opinion refers to historical evidence of
original meaning may improperly code as originalist opinions that ultimately
conclude that historical evidence of original meaning does not supply a basis to
decide the cases, just as Brown concluded that the evidence of the Framing-era
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment did not supply a basis for decision in
that case. A coding methodology that more rigorously assesses whether
originalism drives judicial decision-making better gauges the impact of
originalism on judicial decision-making, and for that reason could unearth
meaningful differences in the jurisprudence of individual Justices related to their
use of originalism.
Consider Payton v. New York.97 In that case, the Court held that absent
exigent circumstances, a warrant must issue before the authorities can make a
forcible entry to arrest an individual in his residence.98 The Court engaged in a
lengthy discussion of the Framing-era law of arrest before concluding that “the
issue is not one that can be said to have been definitively settled by the common
law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”99 Justice White’s
dissenting opinion, in contrast, relied heavily on the Framing-era law of arrest,
using it as the basis for his conclusion that the Fourth Amendment requires no
warrant to make a forcible entry to the arrestee’s home to effect an arrest for a
felony.100 A methodology that codes both opinions as originalist because both
discuss historical evidence of original meaning would ignore the critical
difference between the opinions. Justice White’s opinion uses historical
evidence of original meaning to decide the case, while the opinion of the Court
does not. Under the definition of originalism advanced above, only Justice
White’s dissenting opinion in Payton qualifies as originalist.
Accordingly, coding opinions as originalist merely because they reference
historical evidence of original meaning overlooks the reality that sometimes an
opinion may consult evidence of original meaning, and yet, as in Brown, find it
inadequate to decide the case before the Court.101 To assess the extent to which
originalism drives Fourth Amendment law, there is no substitute for reading
opinions and identifying the claims that they make about original meaning. This
represents no radical innovation in empirical legal scholarship; a standard social
science technique—“content analysis”—has been increasingly used in empirical
legal scholarship to analyze judicial opinions.102 This study is the first to employ
methods of content analysis to assess the prevalence of originalism in Supreme

97. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
98. Id. at 586–90.
99. Id. at 598.
100. Id. at 604–15 (White, J., dissenting).
101. Cf. Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here than
Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 312–15 (2005) (concluding from a review of the pertinent
opinions that citations to The Federalist Papers have rarely been important to Supreme Court decisions).
102. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 63, 69–76 (2008).
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Court jurisprudence.103
This study employed a straightforward approach to case selection and
coding by employing methods of content analysis.104 All cases decided by signed
opinion of the Court during Justice Scalia’s career, in which the Court decided
a disputed issue of Fourth Amendment law, are included within the study.105
After review of the opinions in those cases, each that expressed a view on a
disputed question of Fourth Amendment law was coded. The study employed
three codes: Originalist (“O”), Nonoriginalist (“NO”), and Nonoriginalist But
Original Meaning Considered (“NOBOMC”). To code opinions, the two criteria
for originalist adjudication stated above—fixation and constraint—were
employed.
An opinion was coded O when it relied upon historical evidence or
otherwise invoked the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment as fixed at
framing and ratification—thereby reflecting fixation—and when it also utilized
original meaning to reach a determination on the issue of Fourth Amendment
law before the Court—thereby reflecting constraint. It would have been
unrealistic, however, to code as originalist only opinions that rely on nothing

103. A somewhat similar methodology for coding, albeit to a different end and unaccompanied by anything
approaching random case selection, was used by Jamal Greene, who, in order to assess the circumstances under
which the Supreme Court employs originalism, coded as originalist those opinions in which references to debates
over the Constitution’s ratification or the views or expectations of the framing generation “form a significant
part of the opinion’s affirmative analysis,” while cautioning that an opinion in which these materials “are not
mentioned, are merely gestured at, or are described only as consistent with an outcome reached through other
methods is not an originalist opinion.” Greene, supra note 28, at 1659. Professor Greene did not purport to utilize
a representative dataset, however, but instead selected particular cases to study. Id. at 1658–80. This
methodology may be sufficient, as Professor Greene suggested, “to support a strong hypothesis that others are
free to test, whether through intuition, anecdote, or more rigorous methods,” id. at 1658, but given its potential
for selection bias, it must be viewed with skepticism.
104. The following discussion sets out the protocol utilized for coding in this study. All Supreme Court
opinions containing Fourth Amendment holdings within the relevant time frame, after initial review by student
researchers, were reviewed and coded by the author. For a helpful discussion of best practices in undertaking
content analysis of judicial opinions that informed the design of this study, see Hall & Wright, supra note 102,
at 100–16. A complete list of opinions and their coding in this study is provided in the Appendix.
105. The study included two cases in which there was no opinion of the Court joined by a majority, but
instead signed lead opinions announcing the judgment of the Court and joined by a plurality: O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality). Opinions in which
Fourth Amendment law is discussed, but in which the Court does not actually decide any question of Fourth
Amendment law, are not included in the study. For examples, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)
(plurality) (the Due Process Clause does not govern pretrial deprivations of liberty), and Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384 (2007) (the rule for accrual of damages claims arising from wrongful arrest). Unsigned per curiam
opinions were excluded from the study because they are often issued in cases regarded as relatively routine that
do not require a detailed explanation of the Court’s reasoning. See Michael C. Gizzi & Stephen L. Wasby, Per
Curiams Revisited: Assessing the Unsigned Opinion, 96 JUDICATURE 110, 112–13 (2012) (“Many per curiam
opinions are used to resolve routine matters or issues that do not require a full explanation of the Court’s
reasoning.”); see also STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 350–57 (10th ed. 2013)
(describing the Court’s practice of summary reversal by per curiam opinion and the objections it has
engendered).
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more than original meaning; judicial opinions often invoke multiple
considerations in support of their conclusions.106 Accordingly, whenever an
opinion employed historical evidence as part of an opinion’s resolution of a
disputed question of Fourth Amendment law, the opinion reflects, at least to
some extent, both fixation and constraint, and was therefore coded O, even if an
opinion also referenced nonoriginalist considerations.107 However, an opinion’s
reference to the text of the Fourth Amendment, without more, did not suffice to
code that opinion O. When an opinion gives the text the meaning that a
contemporary reader would afford it, without reference to original meaning,
fixation and constraint play no role in producing that meaning, and therefore the
opinion does not fall within this study’s definition of originalism.108 In this
fashion, the study’s methodology observed a distinction between nonoriginalist
textualism and originalism.
An opinion was coded NO when it made no reference to original meaning,
invoking neither fixation nor constraint. Such opinions satisfy neither of the
elements of the definition of originalism employed in this study, and were coded
accordingly.
An opinion was coded as NOBOMC when the opinion referenced historical
evidence or otherwise invoked original meaning (potentially reflecting fixation),
but found original meaning inadequate to resolve the issue before the Court or
otherwise made no use of original meaning to resolve the issue before the Court,
thereby failing to satisfy the constraint principle.109 Because these opinions do

106. Cf. Greene, supra note 28, at 1658–59 (“A typical constitutional opinion contains multiple modes of
analysis. . . . To argue that an opinion is originalist only when originalism is the sole mode of analysis or when
it is announced as dispositive is too demanding a measure.”).
107. For example, in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
concluded that on probable cause to search a vehicle, an officer can search packages belonging to a passenger
based on both historical evidence of original meaning, id. at 300–02, and, “[e]ven if the historical evidence . . .
were thought to be equivocal,” id. at 303, by reference to a nonoriginalist balancing test. Id. at 303–07. Houghton
was coded “O” because the opinion used original meaning to resolve the issue before the Court, even though it
also advanced a nonoriginalist basis for decision.
108. For example, in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), the Court held that a search authorized by a
warrant that did not identify the items to be seized did not comport with the Fourth Amendment, even though
the application for the warrant properly identified those items, because the warrant contravened the particularity
requirement found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 557–63. The opinion of the Court in Groh
was coded “NO” because the Court neither made a reference to nor did it place any reliance on historical
evidence of original meaning.
109. In opinions addressing multiple issues, only the portions of the opinion resolving a disputed question
of Fourth Amendment law were coded. For example, in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), which involved
questions of Fourth Amendment law and qualified immunity, only the portion of the opinion resolving a disputed
question of Fourth Amendment law (whether the Fourth Amendment permits reporters to accompany officials
executing an otherwise valid search warrant) was coded. When an opinion contained a discussion of more than
one issue of Fourth Amendment law, only the portion of the opinion resolving the primary Fourth Amendment
issue in the case was coded. The primary issue, in turn, was determined by reference to the length of the
discussion addressing each question of Fourth Amendment law in the opinion. For example, in Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the Court rejected an argument that Atwater’s warrantless custodial arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment because it was inconsistent with Framing-era common law, id. at 326–45, and
an argument that a custodial arrest for a nonjailable offense in the absence of a showing of need for immediate
detention is an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 345–54. Because the
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not reflect constraint, they do not fall within the definition of originalism
employed by this study. Nevertheless, because these opinions consider evidence
of original meaning, they reflect a high likelihood that their use of nonoriginalist
grounds for decision is not the result of a failure to consider potential originalist
grounds of decision, but instead the inadequacy of original meaning to resolve
the issue before the Court.
Coding was based exclusively on the claims made in an opinion, and did
not involve any assessment of the soundness of an opinion’s use of
originalism.110
To prevent stare decisis from skewing the study’s results, when an opinion
relied on a prior precedent to resolve a disputed issue of Fourth Amendment law,
the earlier opinion was reviewed and coded, and the code was then applied to
the subsequent case. Accordingly, opinions that relied on originalist precedent
to decide a question of Fourth Amendment law were coded that way.111 This
procedure ensured that an opinion’s reliance on precedent did not obscure the
role of original meaning in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Justices’ individual votes were coded based on the code assigned to the
opinions that each joined in each case. When a Justice joined more than one
opinion, if any of the opinions that the Justice joined was coded O, the Justice’s
vote was coded that way; if not, and if any of the opinions that the Justice joined
was coded as NOBOMC, the Justice’s vote was coded that way.112 This

opinion devoted more words to the former holding, that was the holding coded in this study. The dissenting
opinion, in contrast, considered only the latter argument. id. at 360–73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). It was
therefore this discussion that was coded for the dissenting opinion.
110. For example, the Court’s treatment of the historical evidence of original meaning in Atwater has been
subject to fierce criticism. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) (offering a detailed critique of Justice Souter’s majority opinion in
Atwater and contending that the opinion’s “supposed historical analysis” consisted entirely of “historical ploys
and distortions of the historical sources”). Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court in Atwater was coded “O.”
111. For example, in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), neither Justice White’s plurality opinion nor
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which assessed whether aerial observations of the interior of a
greenhouse amounted to an unconstitutional search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, made any
reference to historical evidence of Framing-era meaning. Rather, to determine the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection, both opinions relied principally on the earlier decision involving aerial surveillance of
a fenced-in backyard in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–52 (plurality
opinon); id. at 452–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Ciraolo was decided outside the study period,
but it was reviewed and coded O because it made use of the Framing-era concept of “curtilage” as identifying
the extent of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for property associated with a home. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
212–13. Accordingly, the opinions of Justice White and Justice O’Connor in Riley were also coded O.
112. In cases in which Justices voted but did not write or join any opinion, their votes were not coded. For
an example, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), in which Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun
dissented without opinion. In cases in which the only opinion that a Justice joined does not reach any question
of Fourth Amendment law, even when the opinion of the Court in the same case did so, that vote was not coded.
For an example, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23–34 (1995), in which Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting
opinion, but only addressed the jurisdictional issue in the case.
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procedure ensured that all references to original meaning were reflected in the
coding of votes, even when a Justice also joined an opinion that relied on
nonoriginalist grounds.
II. RESULTS
Table 1 endeavors to identify a baseline rate at which originalism appears
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It reflects the manner in which opinions of
the Court during the study period (Justice Scalia’s career on the Court)
addressing disputed questions of Fourth Amendment law were coded:
TABLE 1: OPINIONS OF THE COURTa
1986–2016b

NO

NOBOMC

O

69/102

19/102

14/102

67.64%

18.63%

13.73%

Opinions of the Court

a
Plurality opinions were coded as opinions of the Court in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987),
and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
b
Includes only opinions in cases decided during Justice Scalia’s tenure.

Table 1 shows that originalist decisions represent a small fraction of the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Table 1 does not reflect,
however, what may be varying individual commitments to originalist
methodology among the Members of the Court.
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To identify the methodology reflected in the voting behavior of individual
Justices, Table 2 (below) reflects the coding of votes cast by each Member of
the Court (listed in order of appointment) in cases in which the Justice wrote or
joined an opinion addressing a disputed question of Fourth Amendment law:
TABLE 2: VOTES CAST BY EACH JUSTICEC

c

Justice

NO

NOBOMC

O

Brennan
(1986–1990)
White
(1986–1993)
Marshall
(1986–1991)
Blackmun
(1986–1994)
Powell
(1986–1987)
Rehnquist
(1986–2005)
Stevens
(1986–2010)
O’Connor
(1986–2006)
Scalia
(1986–2016)
Kennedy
(1988–2016)
Souter
(1990–2009)
Thomas
(1991–2016)
Ginsburg
(1993–2016)
Breyer
(1994–2016)
Roberts
(2005–2016)
Alito
(2006–2016)
Sotomayor
(2009–2016)
Kagan
(2010–2016)

20/26
76.92%
24/34
70.59%
23/32
71.875%
26/34
76.47%
5/8
62.50%
48/69
69.57%
56/84
66.67%
50/72
69.44%
63/102
60.78%
60/92
65.22%
36/57
63.16%
41/70
58.57%
41/67
61.19%
43/67
64.18%
20/30
66.67%
18/28
64.29%
10/18
55.56%
8/16
50.00%

3/26
11.54%
5/34
14.705%
5/32
15.625%
4/34
11.76%
2/8
25.00%
10/69
14.49%
20/84
23.81%
11/72
15.28%
21/102
20.59%
21/92
22.83%
12/57
21.05%
18/70
25.71%
21/67
31.34%
17/67
25.37%
9/30
30.00%
10/28
35.71%
6/18
33.33%
7/16
43.75%

3/26
11.54%
5/34
14.705%
4/32
12.50%
4/34
11.765%
1/8
12.50%
11/69
15.94%
8/84
9.52%
11/72
15.28%
19/102
18.63%
11/92
11.96%
9/57
15.79%
11/70
15.71%
5/67
7.46%
7/67
10.45%
1/30
3.33%
0/28
00.00%
2/18
11.11%
1/16
6.25%

Includes only opinions in cases decided during Justice Scalia’s tenure.

As Table 2 illustrates, despite his professed commitment to originalism,
Justice Scalia voted on originalist grounds in only 18.63% of cases in which the
Court decided a disputed question of Fourth Amendment law. This is the highest
rate of any Justice in the study, but not strikingly higher than the rate at which
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originalism appeared in opinions of the Court (13.73%). In a slightly higher
percentage of cases (20.59%), Justice Scalia referenced historical evidence or
other indicia of original meaning, but did not cast his vote on that basis.
Equally striking is the voting pattern of Justice Thomas, who has also
professed fealty to originalism.113 Nevertheless, his votes were premised on
originalist grounds in only 15.71% of cases. Justice Thomas, however,
considered original meaning in 25.71% of cases—a higher percentage than
Justice Scalia. This suggests not so much a lack of methodological commitment
to originalism by Justice Thomas as the inability of originalism, in his view, to
provide answers to the questions of Fourth Amendment law before the Court.
Notably, virtually all members of the Court exhibited some willingness to
base decisions on originalist grounds, despite their individual methodological
commitments. For example, in his extrajudicial writing, Justice Breyer has
professed opposition to originalism, cataloging what he regards as its defects.114
Nevertheless, his votes were based on originalist grounds in 10.45% of cases, a
rate of originalist voting about two-thirds the rate of Justice Thomas. Justice
Brennan’s rate of originalist voting in Fourth Amendment cases was even higher
(11.54%), yet, in his extrajudicial writing, Justice Brennan argued that Justices
should read the Constitution in light of its contemporary rather than original
meaning, embracing a nonoriginalist textualism.115 Only Justice Alito cast no
votes on originalist grounds, although he considered original meaning in more
than one-third of Fourth Amendment cases. It seems that all Justices are willing
to consult original meaning when they regard it as helpful in deciding the case
at hand.
To investigate the possibility that Justice Scalia is more likely to reflect his
own methodological commitments in his own opinions, Table 3 reflects the
manner in which opinions written by Justice Scalia were coded, distinguishing
between opinions of the Court (in which he successfully obtained support of at
least four other Justices) and separate opinions in which Justice Scalia
experienced no evident need to gain support from other Justices with potentially
differing methodological commitments.

113. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment in part); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996). Justice Scalia identified Justice Thomas as a
fellow originalist. See Scalia, supra note 35, at 871 (“Today, the secret is out that I am an originalist, and there
is even a second one sitting with me, Justice Clarence Thomas.”).
114. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 115–32
(2005).
115. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (“Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as
twentieth-century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of
interpretation. But the ultimate question must be: What do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius
of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitutional
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our time.”).
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TABLE 3: OPINIONS WRITTEN BY JUSTICE SCALIA
Opinions of the Court

Separate Opinions

NO

NOBOMC

O

8/19

5/19

6/19

42.10%

26.32%

31.58%

5/18

7/18

6/18

27.78%

38.89%

33.33%

Despite the need for a Justice assigned to write an opinion of Court to build
a majority that must likely include Justices with a variety of methodological
commitments, Table 3 indicates that Justice Scalia’s methodology did not vary
substantially based on whether he was writing an opinion of the Court or a
separate opinion.
It is notable that Justice Scalia’s rate of originalist voting in opinions that
he authored is nearly twice the rate of his overall originalist voting reflected in
Table 2, and his rate of considering original meaning in opinions that he authored
is substantially higher as well. In cases in which he did not write an opinion,
perhaps Justice Scalia was willing to defer to the methodological preferences of
the author of the opinion. The soundness of this speculation, however, is open
to question. After all, Justices hoping to have Justice Scalia join their opinions
presumably had an incentive to write in a fashion likely to garner his support,
and for that reason they would have had reason to advance originalist grounds
for decision when available. Justice Scalia’s rate of originalist grounds of
decision in his own opinions may instead be a function of his greater willingness
to write separately, or greater engagement in the case that might result in his
being assigned the opinion of the Court or deciding to write separately, when a
case presented an opportunity for consideration of original meaning.116 Still,
even when Justice Scalia was writing separately, with no apparent need to state
any views but his own, he based his opinions on originalist grounds in only onethird of cases.
As we have seen, Justice Scalia professed adherence to originalism
throughout his tenure on the Court.117 Nevertheless, to investigate the possibility
that Justice Scalia’s commitment to originalism varied over time, Table 4 breaks
down his opinions by five-year intervals:

116. A comparison between Tables 1 and 3 indicates that Justice Scalia was assigned to write opinions of
the Court disproportionately; he wrote the opinion of the Court in 19 of the 102 cases in the study period
(18.63%), almost double the rate (one-ninth) that one would expect if assignments were random.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36.
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TABLE 4: VOTES CAST BY JUSTICE SCALIA (5-YEAR INTERVALS)
NO

NOBOMC

O

23/32

2/32

7/32

71.875%

6.25%

21.875%

4/8

3/8

1/8

50.00%

37.50%

12.50%

12/20

2/20

6/20

60.00%

10.00%

30.00%

10/17

5/17

2/17

58.82%

29.41%

11.76%

7/11

4/11

0/11

63.63%

36.36%

00.00%

6/14

5/14

3/14

42.86%

35.71%

21.43%

1986–1991

1992–1996

1997–2001

2002–2006

2007–2011

2012–2016

Table 4 reflects no obvious shift in Justice Scalia’s methodological
commitments over time. At the beginning and end of his career, Justice Scalia’s
rate of voting on originalist grounds differed little. Although Justice Scalia cast
no originalist votes in the period 2007–2011, and only one in the period 1992–
1996, his rate of originalist votes both before and after those periods was
substantial. However, it is unlikely that this suggests a decreased commitment
to originalism as the cases before the Court in those two periods were likely not
resolvable through the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning, at least in Justice
Scalia’s view.
III. DISCUSSION
Some commentators have argued that Justice Scalia’s commitment to
originalism was inconsistent, and therefore doubted the sincerity of his professed
adherence to that methodology.118 Indeed, this study indicates that at least when
it comes to Fourth Amendment law, Justice Scalia (and Justice Thomas as well)
frequently did not cast their votes on originalist grounds. Justices Scalia and

118. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 29–54 (2002); Barnett, supra note 41, at 13–16; Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 391–99
(2000); Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 953, 969–73 (1999); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 562–69 (2006); see also SEGALL, supra note 16, at 123–40 (also
discussing Justice Thomas’s commitment to originalism).
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Thomas employed originalism to decide a disputed question of Fourth
Amendment law in less than one-fifth of cases. This Part shifts from empiricism
to analysis in an effort to explain the relatively low rate of originalist
adjudication in the study.
One might speculate that the voting patterns of Justices Scalia and Thomas
may be attributable to their lack of commitment to originalism, the influence of
nonoriginalist precedent, the parties’ failure to press originalist arguments, or
perhaps a lack of any need to consider original meaning in some proportion of
Fourth Amendment cases. A close analysis of the cases in the study, however,
suggests that speculation along these lines is not a likely explanation. Instead,
the difficulties in applying original meaning to contemporary search and seizure
litigation suggest that even a sincere originalist determined to prioritize that
method of adjudication above all others would find originalism of limited
utility.119 It is not that Justices Scalia and Thomas rejected originalist grounds of
decision in the cases in this study in favor of some alternative, or that the results
somehow obscure their commitment to originalism; instead, the available
historical evidence suggests that originalism does not offer much in the way of
useful guidance in deciding the cases coded NO or NOBOMC. The voting
patterns of Justices Scalia and Thomas are likely the result of the inability of
originalism to offer a vehicle for deciding the cases before them.
A. UNVARNISHED NONORIGINALISM
It is striking how many opinions in this study, even when authored by
avowed originalists such as Justice Scalia, make no reference to the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When one considers the particular areas of
Fourth Amendment law in which this result was observed, however, rather than
finding an insincere commitment to originalism, the influence of nonoriginalist
precedent, the lack of any need to consult original meaning, or a failure of the
parties to press available originalist grounds of decision, one encounters instead
the difficulties of constructing an originalist alternative to the nonoriginalist
approach taken in the opinions coded NO. Consider the following examples.
1.

Probable Cause

All of the opinions in this study that address the constitutional standard for

119. For scholarship arguing that the historical evidence surrounding the Fourth Amendment is often
conflicting or indeterminate, see, for example, Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for
History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1732–47 (1996); Mannheimer, supra note 91, at 1237–63; and Sklansky, supra
note 78, at 1794–1813. For scholarship considering the difficulties of applying historical evidence of original
meaning to contemporary problems of search and seizure, see, for example, Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395–401 (1974); Davies, supra note 80, at 740–
50; and Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal Dynamism in
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1101–21 (2012).
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probable cause were coded NO, and despite that, all of them were joined by both
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas (two were even written by Justice Scalia).120
The historical record of probable cause, however, suggests that originalism has
little to offer on this question.
In the Framing-era, there was little agreement on the meaning of probable
cause, which was often stated in ways not clearly distinct from suspicion.121 It
was also not clear that officials assessed the adequacy of the evidence supporting
the assertion of probable cause in applications for warrants.122 In the face of this
historical record, originalism offers little reliable guidance. Small wonder, then,
that opinions addressing the standard of probable cause make little use of
historical evidence of original meaning as fixed at the time of framing and
ratification.
2.

Warrantless Search and Seizure

The limits of the historical record similarly infect other basic questions of
Fourth Amendment law. For example, consider the elemental question about
whether search and seizure not previously authorized by a warrant should be
regarded as “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Most

120. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240 (2013) (considering how a court should determine if the “alert”
of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle); United States v.
Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (holding that the affidavit established probable cause to
believe that the triggering event, the delivery of child pornography, would be satisfied); Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 152–56 (2004) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (declining to require probable cause be closely related to the
arresting offense because that would be inconsistent with the Court’s precedent that an officer’s state of mind is
irrelevant to probable cause); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 374 (2003) (holding that the officer had
probable cause to believe Pringle committed the offense). In an opinion issued shortly before the study period,
the Court, in passing, sought a measure support for its definition of probable cause from an 1813 opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“[T]he term ‘probable cause,’ according
to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.” (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339,
348 (1813)) (internal quotation marks omitted))). This formulation, however, stops well short of the test the
Court adopted in Gates: “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of
knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586
(2018) (“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” (citation omitted)).
121. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1314 (2010);
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L. REV. 377, 384–98 (2011); see
also Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically
Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 35–50 (2010) (describing
inconsistencies in Framing-era formulations of probable cause). Contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine
draws a clear distinction between probable cause and mere suspicion, even if reasonable. See, e.g., Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 340–47 (1985); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–16 (1979); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 880–82 (1975).
122. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of
Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17–54 (2007); Oliver, supra note 121, at 384–89. But
see Davies, supra note 46, at 77 & n.122 (concluding that Framing-era judges reviewed the adequacy of warrant
applications alleging probable cause).
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of the opinions of the Court addressing this issue during the study period were
coded NO, with even Justices Scalia and Thomas usually writing or joining
opinions resting on nonoriginalist grounds.123 This is a longstanding pattern;
while the Court has sometimes required search and seizure to be authorized by
warrant, the reasoning in these cases is nonoriginalist. Typical is the invocation
of Justice Jackson’s pragmatic, if nonoriginalist, admonition that “a warrant
ensures that the inferences to support a search are ‘drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”124
There is good reason why an originalist inquiry into the breadth of a
warrant requirement is rarely undertaken; the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment has little to offer. The text itself is silent on the question; it identifies
the prerequisites for a valid warrant, but not whether a warrant is required to
undertake search and seizure.125 This suggests that the question was of little
concern in the Framing era. As for the available historical evidence, there is little
in the way of agreement among scholars. There is, to be sure, consensus that the

123. These opinions, all of which, unless otherwise indicated, were joined by Justice Scalia and, after he
joined the Court, Justice Thomas, are: Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 (2014) (search of apartment based
on consent of occupant after prior objection of co-occupant); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (blood
test of arrestee) (Justice Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011)
(forcible entry and search of residence on claim of exigent circumstances); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S.
746 (2010) (review of police officer’s text messages); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (search of vehicle
incident to occupant’s arrest); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (search of
parolee’s residence); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (entry of residence to provide emergency aid);
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (search of vehicle incident to arrest); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing of students); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112
(2001) (search of probationer’s home); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (drug testing of
obstetrics patients) (Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33 (1996) (validity of consent to search); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (scope of consent to
search); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (search of residence on consent of
occupant); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (search of items in plain view); Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91 (1990) (arrest of houseguest); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (protective sweep of residence
incident to arrest); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of law
enforcement employees) (Justice Scalia dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of railway employees); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(opinion of Scalia, J.) (search of probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (search of
automobile junkyard); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (search and seizure of items
in plain view); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory search of vehicles).
124. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948)). For examples of the Court’s invocation of this rationale, see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717
(1984) (warrantless monitoring of electronic tracking device); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212
(1981) (warrantless entry of home to arrest guest); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 & n.24 (1980)
(warrantless entry of home to arrest resident); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (warrant
issued by state attorney general invalid).
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
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Fourth Amendment was originally understood to prohibit search and seizure
based on general warrants.126 After that, however, agreement breaks down.
Some scholars have pointed to Framing-era evidence that warrantless search and
seizure was often permitted to conclude that the Fourth Amendment’s original
meaning is inconsistent with a warrant requirement.127 Others have noted the
Framing-era acceptance of particularized warrants and argue that the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment treated judicial authorization as preferable
to warrantless intrusions,128 although some have cautioned that the Framing-era
warrant requirement was likely confined to searches of residences.129 Some
think that the historical evidence points to no reliable conclusion.130
Beyond these difficulties, there is a perhaps more fundamental question
about whether the Framing-era context renders the original understanding
irrelevant to contemporary search and seizure. In the Framing-era, there was no
equivalent to contemporary police; law enforcement was undertaken primarily
by constables, sheriffs, and the night watch, whose duties were largely confined
to executing judicial orders and responding to breaches of the peace.131 As
George Thomas put it, what Framing-era officials “did not do was investigate
crime.”132 Instead, as Wesley Oliver observed, “For most crimes, [victims] alone
conducted the investigation, identified suspects, and determined whether their
suspicions were adequate to initiate a criminal prosecution.”133
Moreover, tort liability circumscribed the authority of Framing-era law
enforcement officials; although officers executing a warrant had immunity from
tort liability, officers who sought warrants could face personal liability in tort if

126. CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 770–72; GRAY, supra note 78, at 139–43; LANDYNSKI, supra note 43, at
19–48; NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 100–03 (1937); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 22–34 (2012); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
29–44 (1969); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
977, 978–90 (2004); Davies, supra note 80, at 600–18; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two
Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1391–94 (1989).
127. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 3–17
(1997); TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 38–44; Arcila, supra note 121, at 1280–1326.
128. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 126, at 30–36; ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868, at 50–54, 61–65 (2006); Tracey Maclin, The
Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 950–72 (1997).
129. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 739–45, 773–77; Donohue, supra note 79, at 1276–80, 1321–24;
David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding Revisited, 33 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 47, 62–69 (2005).
130. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 119, at 1745–47; Davies, supra note 80, at 550–52; Wasserstrom, supra
note 126, at 1394–96.
131. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28–29, 68 (1993); Davies,
supra note 110, at 419–32; Dripps, supra note 119, at 1094–97; Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History
of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 450–56 (2010); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 830–32 (1994); George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward
History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 200–01, 225–28 (2010).
132. Thomas, supra note 131, at 201.
133. Oliver, supra note 121, at 382.
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the search pursuant to warrant proved fruitless or if they undertook a warrantless
search or seizure that a jury concluded had exceeded the officer’s lawful
authority.134
Given the limited duties of Framing-era public officers and the threat of
personal liability that they faced, especially when they acted without
authorization by warrant, warrantless search and seizure was likely a rarity. As
one legal scholar concluded: “Warrantless searches and seizures were virtually
nonexistent or at least uncontroversial.”135 Thus, there would have been little
reason for the Framing generation to consider whether the Fourth Amendment
embodied a preference for warrants in light of the limited authority and incentive
for officers to act without them.
The Framing-era regime of law enforcement proved unsatisfactory; in the
nineteenth century, in response to increasing crime and social instability, cities
began to establish police forces with investigative responsibilities.136 Moreover,
as investigative responsibilities enlarged, to minimize the risk that newlyempowered law enforcement personnel would be inhibited in the performance
of their duties, exposure to tort liability diminished. Soon after the Constitution’s
ratification, Congress began to expand the defenses available in actions arising
from customs searches, apparently because of the perceived need to encourage
officials to undertake such searches.137 Congress also began to indemnify public
officials for judgments against them arising from the performance of their
duties.138 Today, indemnification of police and other public officials is
common.139 Moreover, since the Framing, a doctrine of official immunity from

134. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History of
Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REV. 363, 371–79 (2009); Davies, supra note 80, at 624–34, 650–54;
Davies, supra note 46, at 72–75, 91–93; Thomas, supra note 131, at 225–28; see also AMAR, supra note 127, at
10–17 (discussing the immunity from tort liability conferred by a particularized warrant).
135. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 2.2.1, at 41 (2d
ed. 2014); cf. Davies, supra note 121, at 21 (“[T]he common-law authorities said virtually nothing about
warrantless searches. The explanation for that silence seems to be partly that there was not much to search for
(other than stolen property), and partly that it was assumed that an arrestee would routinely be searched for
weapons or stolen goods whenever an arrest was made.”).
136. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 131, at 68–71; DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN
UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800–1887, at 12–40
(1979); THOMAS A. REPPETTO, THE BLUE PARADE 2–23 (1978); JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 6–15, 19–32 (1974); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 49–51 (1980); Dripps, supra note 119, at 1098–1101; Steiker, supra note 131, at 832–34. For a helpful
discussion of the extent to which nineteenth-century police acquired new investigative powers, see Oliver, supra
note 131, at 461–68.
137. See, e.g., Arcila, supra note 134, at 392–420; Davies, supra note 46, at 91–93.
138. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1865–70 (2010).
139. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional
Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 812–13 & n.51, 819–20 (2007); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912–37 (2014).
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tort liability has emerged.140 As currently understood, qualified immunity grants
law enforcement officials a qualified immunity for unconstitutional conduct that
does not violate clearly established law,141 and is justified by the potential for
over-deterrence if public employees were strictly liable for their constitutional
torts.142
Accordingly, in light of the radical expansion in responsibilities of those
engaged in law enforcement, and the concomitantly reduced role of tort liability
in circumscribing the discretionary authority of public officials, there is reason
to question whether the apparent lack of a warrant requirement in the Framing
era has fair application to contemporary search and seizure.143 It may have been
much easier to regard warrantless search and seizure as “reasonable” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the Framing-era regime, in which official
authority was far more circumscribed, and the threat of personal liability in tort
far greater, than today.144 The difficulties in applying historical evidence of
original meaning to the vastly changed contemporary landscape of search and
seizure seems to be the most likely explanation for the prevalence of
nonoriginalism in cases considering a warrant requirement.
3.

Exclusion

Similar difficulties arise in utilizing originalism to address whether
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be used in criminal
prosecutions.
All the cases in the study period addressing the question of exclusion were
coded NO (although some mention original meaning on issues other than
exclusion), and in all of these cases, even Justice Scalia and (after his
appointment) Justice Thomas joined opinions based on nonoriginalist
grounds.145 Notably, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court (as well as an
140. See Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and
How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 150–58 (2012).
141. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203–07
(2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643–44 (1987).
142. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407–08 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167–
68 (1992); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985).
143. Cf. Davies, supra note 80, at 725 (“These developments . . . destroyed the common-law premises that
had grounded the Framers’ belief that a ban against general warrants would suffice to ensure the right to be
secure in person and house. Likewise, these developments undermined trespass actions against individual
officers as a means of enforcing legal limits on search and arrest authority. By the end of the nineteenth century,
the warrantless officer posed a far more potent threat to the security of person and house than the Framers had
ever anticipated.” (footnote omitted)).
144. For incisive scholarly discussions along these lines, see Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal
Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1595–
603 (1996), and Steiker, supra note 131, at 830–38, 852–56.
145. See generally Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (relying on Fourth Amendment precedent,
and not original meaning, to enforce the use of the exclusionary rule); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135
(2009) (using the judicially-created deterrence effect rationale to hold that the exclusionary rule did not apply);
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (coded NOBOMC because of references to the common-law knockand-announce principle) (holding that the social costs balanced against deterrence weighed in favor of not
applying the exclusionary rule); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (opinion of Thomas, J.)
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additional plurality opinion) in Hudson v. Michigan which, although doubtful of
the case for exclusion, confined its criticism to nonoriginalist grounds.146
Nevertheless, a handful of scholars have opposed the exclusionary rule on the
ground that in the Framing era, the remedy for a wrongful search and seizure
was an award of damages in tort.147 But, even granting that in the Framing era
tort liability rather than exclusion was the order of the day, there are a variety of
difficulties in making an originalist case against the exclusionary rule.148
As we have seen, in the Framing era, search and seizure undertaken without
a valid warrant presented a serious risk of personal liability in tort, and the
Fourth Amendment had prohibited the general warrant—what the Framing
generation likely perceived as the most serious threat of abusive search and
seizure.149 This reliance on personal tort liability to constrain search and seizure
authority, to be sure, presented a serious risk of over-deterrence; but if officials
are not expected to perform much in the way of investigative activity, overdeterrence is not of much concern.
Once police forces emerged that were expected to proactively investigate
crime, however, over-deterrence became a greater concern, and the reduced
threat of personal liability that accompanied the emergence of indemnification
and tort immunities meant that the threat of damages liability was no longer as
effective a constraint on the abuse of authority. Under contemporary

(using a balancing calculus, rather than original meaning or textualism, to find that the exclusionary rule did not
apply); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (noting that exclusion is not mandated by the text of the Fourth
Amendment, but rather is a judicially created remedy); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (coded
NOBOMC because of references to the historical sanctity of the home) (using a balancing test to find that
exclusion was not appropriate); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s
nonoriginalist dissent) (arguing that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the lack of a deterrent effect);
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (rooting the independent source doctrine in
its lack of a deterrent effect rather than in a historical use); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (same, except
discussing the good-faith exception).
146. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590–99; id. at 599–602 (plurality).
147. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 127, at 20–22; William Gangi, The Exclusionary Rule: A Case Study in
Judicial Usurpation, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 33, 39–46, 125–29 (1984–1985). Indeed, in the Framing era, the fact
that a search produced incriminating evidence was considered a defense to tort liability. AMAR, supra note 127,
at 7; Arcila, supra note 121, at 1316–17. There is some debate, however, about whether this defense was
recognized for a trespass to a residence. Compare Davies, supra note 80, at 647–49 (denying the existence of a
defense), with Arcila, supra note 121, at 1317–24 (arguing that the defense was recognized).
148. For an effort to justify exclusion on originalist grounds, see Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2009–2010); and Roger Roots, The Framers’ Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Mounting Evidence, 15 NEV. L.J. 42 (2014). For skeptical responses, see
Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525,
532–33 (2013); and Rohith V. Srinivas, The Exclusionary Rule as Fourth Amendment Judicial Review, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 179, 205 (2012).
149. See e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 771–72; Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary
Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 571–
79 (1983).
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circumstances, accordingly, tort remedies have been drained of much of their
potency, and therefore the case for an exclusionary remedy is far more powerful
than in the Framing era.150 This evidence suggests that the disappearance of the
Framing-era regime of tort liability offers a compelling explanation for the
absence of originalism in contemporary exclusionary rule jurisprudence. The
nonoriginalism prevalent in exclusionary rule jurisprudence, in other words, is
less an artifact of the force of nonoriginalist precedent than a reflection of the
difficulties of developing an authentically originalist alternative to exclusion.
B. HISTORICALLY-MINDED NONORIGINALISM
Opinions were coded NOBOMC when they consulted original meaning yet
found it inadequate to resolve the matter before the Court. These opinions are of
special interest because they reflect a high likelihood that a failure to utilize
original meaning to resolve the issue before the Court is not the result of judicial
inadvertence, nonoriginalist precedent, or the parties’ failure to press originalist
arguments. Indeed, these opinions reflect the difficulties of applying original
meaning to contemporary problems of search and seizure. Again, some
examples illustrate the point.
1.

Warrantless Search and Seizure

As we have seen, there is great difficulty in developing an originalist view
of the circumstances under which the Fourth Amendment requires that search
and seizure be authorized by warrant.151 Thus, it should be unsurprising that the
professed originalist Justices in this study, while taking some care to examine
the historical evidence, ultimately found it inconclusive.
For example, Justice Thomas, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, wrote:
“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment’s history, which is clear as to the Amendment’s
principal target (general warrants), [is] not as clear with respect to when warrants
were required, if ever.”152 Similarly, Justice Scalia acknowledged: “[C]hanges
in the surrounding legal rules (for example, elimination of the common-law rule
that reasonable, good-faith belief was no defense to absolute liability for
trespass) may make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once was
not.”153 Thus, these opinions strongly suggest that it is the difficulties in utilizing
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment to illuminate the reach of
warrantless search-and-seizure authority that explain the prevalence of
nonoriginalist opinions in this area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.154

150. For more extensive arguments along these lines, see Dripps, supra note 144, at 1598–1600; Rosenthal,
supra note 148, at 532–37; and Steiker, supra note 131, at 847–52.
151. See supra Subpart III.A.2.
152. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).
154. Some scholars, focusing on the Fourth Amendment’s incorporation within the Fourteenth, have argued
that the Fourth Amendment’s meaning should be assessed as it was understood at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
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School and Other Special-Needs Searches

Another example in which originalism has offered even originalist Justices
little aid involves searches justified in terms of particular governmental interests
with little in the way of Framing-era antecedents.
The Court confronted the question whether random drug testing of athletes
at a public high school violated the Fourth Amendment in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton.155 Justice Scalia’s opinion of the Court, joined by Justice
Thomas, acknowledged the eighteenth-century rule that when parents place their
children in schools the school acts in loco parentis and is permitted to exercise
wide-ranging parental powers,156 but nevertheless described the case as one
“where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted,” reasoning
that the emergence of compulsory school attendance laws, as well as the drug
problem and drug-testing technology called for a reasonableness test for
assessing school searches not derived from historical evidence of fixed, original
meaning, but instead “judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”157
In a later opinion joined by Justice Scalia, the Court applied this
nonoriginalist balancing test to hold that requiring a student to remove her
clothes down to her underwear as school officials searched for unauthorized
prescription-strength medication violated the Fourth Amendment.158 Justice

RECONSTRUCTION 219–30, 267–68 (1998); TASLITZ, supra note 128, at 242–56. The prevailing understanding
of the Fourth Amendment at the time, however, was little developed from the Framing era; the leading
commentators of the era offered little more than the view that the Fourth Amendment forbade general warrants.
See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299–308 (Little, Brown & Co. 1868); JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 153–54 (Hurd &
Houghton 1868); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1902
(Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873) (1833). Moreover, an officer’s exposure to tort liability for exceeding the
scope of his authority persisted at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification. See, e.g., 1
JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 168, 181 (Little, Brown &
Co. 2d ed. 1872) (1866); WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20–21, 34–44, 47 (W.
Publ’g Co. 1895). Contemporary commentators who have argued for a Reconstruction-era understanding of the
Fourth Amendment argue only that it requires greater sensitivity to racial discrimination in search and seizure
when administering the search-and-seizure law. See, e.g., AMAR, supra, at 267–68; TASLITZ, supra, at 256–57;
I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 918–26
(2015).
155. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
156. Id. at 654–55.
157. Id. at 652–53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
158. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–77 (2009).
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Thomas, however, disagreed on originalist grounds, contending that the
Framing-era rule of in loco parentis should be incorporated within the Fourth
Amendment, thereby granting school officials essentially unlimited parental
authority over students at school.159 Yet, as we have seen, in Acton (which
Justice Thomas joined), Justice Scalia rejected this approach, noting that the
advent of contemporary compulsory school attendance laws rendered the
Framing-era rule inapplicable.
It is far from clear that there is any originalist methodology available for
determining whether the Framing-era doctrine of in loco parentis should retain
its force once school attendance become compulsory, rather than purely a
creature of contract. Justice Scalia’s position on this issue appears to reflect the
difficulties of applying Framing-era understanding in a changed context rather
than an insufficient commitment to originalist adjudication.
School search cases are an example of the “special needs” doctrine, in
which searches and seizures thought to “serve[] special governmental needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” are assessed not through an
originalist methodology reflecting fixation and constraint, but instead by
“balanc[ing] the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s
interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level
of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”160 All of the opinions in
the study addressing special-needs justifications for search and seizure were
coded as nonoriginalist, either NO or NOBOMC.161 Because these cases involve
governmental functions or interests that, like compulsory public education, lack

159. Id. at 398–402 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
160. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989).
161. In addition to the school-search cases discussed above, the opinions in the special-needs cases, all of
which, unless otherwise indicated, were joined by Justice Scalia and, after he joined the Court, Justice Thomas,
are: City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (record-keeping requirements for hotels) (Justice
Scalia’s dissent mentions Framing-era regulation of hotels but he does not base his dissenting vote on that
ground); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (DNA testing of arrestees) (Justice Scalia’s dissent mentions a
Framing-era rule against general warrants but he does not base his dissenting vote on that ground); Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (blood test of arrestee) (Justice Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds);
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (review of police officer’s text messages); Samson v. California,
547 U.S. 843 (2006) (search of parolee’s residence) (written by Justice Thomas); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S.
419 (2004) (checkpoint to question potential witnesses); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing of students); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (search of probationer’s
home); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (drug testing of obstetrics patients) (Justices Scalia
and Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (officer’s detention
of suspect outside home pending issuance of warrant); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
(drug-detection checkpoint in which Justice Thomas’s dissent mentioned that the Framers might have
disapproved of such a roadblock but he did not base his decision on that ground); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305 (1997) (drug-testing of candidates); Mich. Dep’t of St. Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety
checkpoint); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of law enforcement
employees) (Justice Scalia dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989) (drug testing of railway employees); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (written by Justice
Scalia) (search of probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (search of automobile
junkyard); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of public employee’s office) (Justice Scalia
concurring on nonoriginalist grounds).
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a Framing-era equivalent, it is perhaps unsurprising that originalism has offered
little useful guidance even to members of the Court favorably inclined toward
originalist adjudication.
3.

Cellphone Searches

Yet another example of the inability of original meaning to offer a vehicle
for deciding a disputed question of Fourth Amendment law involves the
inspection of the digital contents of a cellphone incident to the otherwise lawful
arrest of its owner. In Riley v. California,162 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion of
the Court (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) characterized the question
whether the contents of a cellphone can be inspected incident to an arrest as one
on which there was no “guidance from the founding era,” therefore requiring the
Court to evaluate the search “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”163 The Court
reached this decision despite acknowledging the longstanding rule permitting
the search of property in the possession of an arrestee incident to the arrest,164
reasoning that a search of the digital contents of a cellphone involves a far
greater intrusion on privacy than an inspection of physical objects found on an
arrestee’s person.165 It is hard to disagree with this assessment; but, it means that
originalism offers little useful guidance. Assessments of reasonableness made
when all searches were physical do not help much to identify the Fourth
Amendment constraints on digital searches.
4.

Stop and Frisk

Consider as well the paradigmatically nonoriginalist stop-and-frisk holding
of Terry. Terry was called into question by Justice Scalia, who doubted whether
a physical search of an individual temporarily detained on suspicion would have
been regarded as reasonable in the Framing era.166 Even so, Justice Scalia
acknowledged the difficulties of an originalist assessment of Terry.
In the Framing era, Justice Scalia observed, “it had long been considered
reasonable to detain suspicious persons . . . . This is suggested, in particular, by
the so-called night-walker statutes,” but, he added, “[w]hen . . . the detention did

162. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
163. Id. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
164. Id. at 2482.
165. Id. at 2484–91.
166. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380, 380–82 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scholars have also
questioned the originalist credentials of Terry. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 80, at 629 n.216; Sklansky, supra
note 78, at 1804–05; George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees
the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1514–16 (2005).
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not rise to the level of a full-blown arrest (and was not supported by the degree
of cause needful for that purpose), there appears to be no clear support at
common law for physically searching the suspect.”167 Nevertheless, under the
night-walker statutes, “the temporary detention of a suspicious character [c]ould
be elevated to a full custodial arrest on probable cause—as, for instance, when
a suspect was unable to provide a sufficient accounting of himself.”168 Thus,
although there was no Framing-era understanding that it was reasonable to stop
and frisk an individual except during a search incident to arrest, it was regarded
reasonable to detain and even arrest suspicious individuals. Moreover, as Justice
Scalia acknowledged, the development since the Framing era of highly efficient
firearms may alter the calculus for whether an investigative frisk is “reasonable”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an officer approaches a
potentially dangerous suspect.169 Given this conflicting evidence, Justice Scalia
could reach no conclusion as to whether Terry’s “result was wrong.”170 Thus,
the persistence of Terry and its nonoriginalist progeny seems an artifact of the
difficulty in developing an originalist approach to stop-and-frisk, rather than the
continuing effects of nonoriginalist precedent. Indeed, as we have seen, that
problem repeatedly surfaces in the opinions coded NOBOMC in this study. An
analysis of the manner in which constitutional text was employed and
understood in the Framing era must account for the possibility that Framing-era
usage was critically dependent on Framing-era context, and for that reason may
not offer useful guidance under contemporary circumstances.
C. LATENT NONORIGINALISM
The difficulties in applying original meaning to contemporary search-andseizure litigation are reflected even in ostensibly originalist opinions. Indeed,
there is reason to believe that this study’s methodology overstates the prevalence
of Fourth Amendment originalism.
Consider again United States v. Watson, in which the Court relied on a
Framing-era rule to uphold warrantless felony arrests in public places based on
probable cause.171 In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Court’s
reliance on the prevailing Framing-era rule permitting warrantless felony arrests
was inapposite because “[o]nly the most serious crimes were felonies at common
law, and many crimes now classified as felonies under federal or state law were

167. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380–81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 381. This authority to arrest on suspicion persisted at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally 1 BISHOP, supra note 154, at § 182; JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 131–33.
169. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest would have
been considered impermissible in 1791, perhaps it was considered permissible by 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment (the basis for applying the Fourth Amendment to the States) was adopted. Or perhaps it is only
since that time that concealed weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach
have become common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the original standard.”).
170. Id.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
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treated as misdemeanors.”172 Although this attack on the contemporary
relevance of the Framing-era distinction between felonies and misdemeanors
failed in Watson, in Tennessee v. Garner,173 the Court held that the prevailing
Framing-era rule authorizing the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon
violated the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that this rule “arose at a time when
virtually all felonies were punishable by death,” and was premised on “the
relative dangerousness of felons,” while today, the distinction between felonies
and misdemeanors is “minor and often arbitrary.”174
Justice White was the author of both Watson and Garner. Yet, in Garner,
Justice White, without explanation, embraced the same argument about the
obsolescence of the Framing-era distinction between felonies and misdemeanors
that he had implicitly rejected in Watson.175 Perhaps the two opinions can be
reconciled; for example, Arnold Loewy speculated that “the Court was more
concerned about unnecessary loss of life (Garner) than the unnecessary loss of
process (Watson).”176 Whether this or some other ground explains the disparate
outcomes, the conclusion seems inescapable that Justice White utilized some
nonoriginalist methodology for justifying departures from Framing-era practice
that led him to reject the contemporary relevance of Framing-era practice in
some cases and not others.
While Garner’s nonoriginalism is apparent, Watson rests on a latent
nonoriginalism. Justice White implicitly concluded that the Framing-era
distinction between felony and misdemeanor arrests had continuing relevance in
Watson; yet nothing in Watson’s account of original meaning explains why that
distinction retained its vitality when it came to arrests, though not when it came
to the use of deadly force to effect those arrests. Although the methodology
employed in this study codes Watson as originalist, in reality, that opinion rests
critically on a nonoriginalist, if unstated, assessment of Justice Marshall’s claim
that changes in distinction between felonies and misdemeanors rendered the
Framing-era law of arrest inapposite.
Once one starts looking for latent nonoriginalism, it appears readily.177
Consider, again, the discussion in Boyd characterizing an order directing an

172. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439–40 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
173. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
174. Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted).
175. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Substitute Arguments in Constitutional Law, 31 J.L. & POL. 237,
238 (2016) (“Justice White . . . nowhere explained why Garner was distinguishable from Watson.”); Silas J.
Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 147 n.213 (1989) (“Justice White’s opinion for the Court in Watson ignored just the sort
of arguments that he relied on in Garner.”).
176. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,
3 (2010).
177. Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1232–42 (2012) (questioning the
prevalence of originalism in constitutional adjudication by examining opinions commonly regarded as
originalist).
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importer to produce business records as an unreasonable search and seizure,
relying on Framing-era conceptions about the search and seizure of private
papers.178 When it described Framing-era “history of controversies on the
subject,” the Court referenced the colonial experience with “writs of assistance
to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected
places for smuggled goods,” and the “practice of issuing general warrants . . .
for searching private houses for the discovery and seizure of books and papers
that might be used to convict their owner of the charge of libel.”179 The Court
acknowledged, however, that in the case before it, “certain aggravating incidents
of actual search and seizure, such as forcible entry into a man’s house and
searching amongst his papers, are wanting.”180
Under scrutiny, Boyd’s originalism disappears; the Court identified no
evidence that in the Framing era, an order to produce papers, unaccompanied by
a forcible trespass onto private property, was considered an unreasonable search
and seizure when not authorized by a warrant supported by a judicial finding of
probable cause.181 Boyd, in short, critically rests on a nonoriginalist argument
that a requirement to produce business records or other property, even if
unaccompanied by the type of force and coercion that inhered in the Framingera conception of an unreasonable search and seizure, should nevertheless be
regarded as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.182 That conclusion may be
sound, but it is not anchored in original meaning.
Latent nonoriginalism of this type is prevalent among the cases coded as
originalist in this study.
1.

Warrantless Search and Seizure

Cases in this study that relied on Carroll’s originalist justification for
upholding warrantless search and seizure of vehicles based on the Framing-era
rule that ships could be searched without a warrant were coded O.183 Yet, it is
unclear whether there is substance to Carroll’s professed originalism.

178. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45.
179. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–26 (1886).
180. Id. at 622.
181. In Boyd, Justice Miller made this very point; while acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment was
crafted to “abolish[] searches under . . . general warrants,” he denied that “requir[ing] the production of evidence
in a suit by mere service of notice on the party, who has that evidence in his possession, can be held to authorize
an unreasonable search or seizure.” Id. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring in the judgment).
182. Cf. Davies, supra note 46, at 117 (“[T]he setting in Boyd was far removed from the Framers’ concern
for the sanctity of the dwelling house and private papers.”); Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth
Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 72 (“Famous search and seizure cases leading up to the Fourth
Amendment involved physical entries into homes, violent rummaging for incriminating items once inside, and
then arrests and the taking away of evidence found.”).
183. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (looking to the laws of the “First, Second, and Fourth
Congresses that authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless searches of ships and to seize concealed goods
subject to duties”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (noting that around Framing customs officials
had the ability to search any ship or vessel without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it
contained goods subject to duty).
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To equate contemporary searches of vehicles with Framing-era searches of
ships, Carroll observed that for “a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or
automobile . . . it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.”184 That contention, however, sounds more pragmatic than
originalist.185 Indeed, Carroll identified no historical evidence to support its
claim that the Framing era search and seizure authority turned on mobility; there
is, in fact, little Framing-era evidence that sheds light on whether warrantless
search and seizure was permitted for carts, carriages, or other types of moveable
property.186 Perhaps the Framing-era tolerance for warrantless searches of ships
rested on considerations other than mobility.
Carroll’s originalism is, accordingly, dubious. Its claimed reliance on
Framing-era practice sufficed to code it and its progeny originalist under this
study’s coding methodology, but that claim may not withstand scrutiny.187
2.

Kyllo

Consider again the holding that the warrantless use of a thermal imager to
identify patterns of heat emanating from a home was an unreasonable search in
Kyllo. The Court’s opinion was coded O because of its insistence on
“preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.”188 Yet, as we have seen in our consideration
of Boyd, the Framing-era conception of an unreasonable search involved forcible
entry and physical intrusion. What was regarded as an unreasonable search and
seizure in the Framing era, accordingly, was far more coercive than passive
electronic surveillance.189 We have no reliable way of knowing if passive

184. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
185. Cf. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State:
Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 130–31 (2006) (“Taft’s heroic effort [in Carroll]
to reinterpret Fourth Amendment doctrine in light of the pragmatic needs of law enforcement, balanced against
the interests of citizens to be free from arbitrary interference, essentially set the framework for modern search
and seizure jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)).
186. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 767 (“[S]hips were subject to warrantless searches when the
[Fourth] Amendment originated. The extent to which other vehicles were so subject is unknowable, however,
for neither case law nor legislation had significantly illuminated the subject.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he historical scope of officers’ authority to search
vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain.”).
187. For attacks on the originalist bona fides of Carroll, see, for example, Davies, supra note 46, at 121–
24; Davies, supra note 80, at 606–08; Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 502–07 (2011); and Sklansky, supra note 78, at 1766–70.
188. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
189. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364–67 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that wiretapping
would have been regarded in the Framing era as eavesdropping not regulated by the Fourth Amendment);
Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 177–
88 (observing that the Framing-era conception may have offered protection against physical intrusion rather than
protection for privacy).
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electronic surveillance—whether electronic eavesdropping as in Katz or the
more limited information collected in Kyllo—would have been regarded in the
Framing era as an unreasonable search or seizure. Notably, in his dissenting
opinion in Kyllo, Justice Stevens argued that the privacy interest at stake was too
trivial to be considered a search.190
Orin Kerr has argued that both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Kyllo reflect “equilibrium adjustment,” in which the Court responds to new
investigative technologies by imposing constitutional regulation that restores the
preexisting equilibrium between investigative authority and privacy, albeit
without claiming that equilibrium adjustment is embedded in the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.191 The lack of any evidence that concern
about equilibrium adjustment is reflected in the historical evidence of original
meaning should be unsurprising; as we have seen, in the Framing era, public
officials had little in the way of investigative authority.192 Maintaining
equilibrium with respect to investigative authority, which was not yet an
important feature of the criminal justice system, is an unlikely account of the
Fourth Amendment’s original meaning. But, even if equilibrium adjustment can
properly be characterized as originalist, the fact that it can justify both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Kyllo makes plain that this methodology
does not offer an originalist rule of decision in Kyllo.
While it may be desirable to prevent advancing technology from eroding
the privacy of the home, that view requires something more than an invocation
of the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment; it requires a normative
argument that any investigative technique that compromises the privacy of the
home should be deemed an unreasonable search and seizure (absent a
particularized warrant), even if unaccompanied by the type of force or coercion
characteristic of search and seizure in the Framing era, and even if the privacy
interest at stake may be trivial.193 After all, the Framing-era conception of an
unreasonable search and seizure involved both an invasion of privacy and the

190. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Kerr, supra note 187, at 496–99.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 131–143.
193. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 119, at 403 (“The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by
constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment lurking
underneath the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz, and it seems to me the judgment that the fourth amendment
inexorably requires the Court to make.”). Even commentators sympathetic to Kyllo frequently acknowledge that
it rests on a normative judgment and not unadorned original meaning. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg
Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology, and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 41–48
(2002) (arguing that Kyllo reflects a judgment about the risks of surveillance that homeowners should be
expected to bear); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 166–70 (2002) (same); Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and
Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 61–72 (2002)
(arguing that Kyllo rests on an unwillingness to engage in balancing); David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future:
Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 178–88 (2002) (arguing that Kyllo reflects a concern for
privacy as a constitutional objective rather than adherence to Framing-era conceptions).
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use of force to effect a physical intrusion. Electronic surveillance disaggregates
the invasion of privacy from the use of force in a manner unknown in the
Framing era. We have no reliable way of knowing whether the Framing-era
conception of an unreasonable search and seizure included an invasion of
privacy unaccompanied by the actual or threatened use of force against a
suspect; the problem never arose. An invocation of original meaning, without
more, will not enable us to decide whether electronic surveillance violates the
Fourth Amendment.194
3.

Jones and Jardines

Consider the holding that attaching a GPS device to the undercarriage of a
vehicle and subsequently monitoring the device to track its movements was a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in United States v.
Jones,195 and its extension to the use of a narcotics-detection dog on the front
porch of a home to detect contraband therein in Florida v. Jardines.196
Both opinions, written by Justice Scalia, were coded O because they rely
on what they characterize as the original meaning of a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment: “physically intruding” to acquire
information.197 Yet, neither opinion identifies any Framing-era evidence to

194. A similar problem appears in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), a case in many
respects similar to Kyllo, albeit outside the study period. Carpenter addressed the question whether the
government’s acquisition of historical cell-site location data from a cellphone provider, pursuant to a court order
but in the absence of a valid warrant, which enabled it to determine the location of Carpenter’s cellphone at the
times that a number of robberies occurred, amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure. The majority opinion
answered the question in the affirmative, relying on Kyllo and stressing the extent to which cell-site location
data expands the government’s ability to monitor individuals’ movements. Id. at 2223. This study would have
coded the opinion as originalist based on its fealty to Kyllo, but as we have seen, Kyllo’s originalism is dubious.
In their dissenting opinions in Carpenter, in contrast, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch contended that the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment extended protection only when an individual’s own person, house, papers,
or effects were subject to search or seizure, and that Carpenter had not established that he had a property or other
interest in the cell-location data sufficient to fall within that protection. Id. at 2241–43 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Of course, the same could have been said about the thermal data acquired
in Kyllo. Justice Alito added that the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment was not understood to govern
the production of documents or other information pursuant to legal process. Id. at 2250–51 (Alito, J., dissenting).
The majority, however, rejected these arguments, observing that cell-site location data gives the government
access to far more pervasive information than anything that could have been obtained previously. Id. at 2220.
We have no way of knowing whether the Framing-era understandings that Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch
invoked were critically dependent on the technological limitations of the era, which effectively constrained the
volume of information about the activities of an investigative target that could be obtained from third parties.
Originalism, in short, offers no ready vehicle for selecting between the approach taken by the majority in
Carpenter, and the approach taken by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch.
195. 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
196. 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
197. Id. at 5 (“When ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses,
papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly
occurred.’” (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3)).
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support such a definition.198 Beyond that, the trespassory conduct in Jones and
Jardines involved such minor intrusions that they might not have been regarded
as problematic in the Framing era; Brian Sawers has demonstrated that in the
Framing-era United States, the prevailing rule was that an unauthorized entry
onto unfenced land of another was generally not regarded as an unlawful trespass
absent damage to the property.199 Moreover, as we have seen, the searches and
seizures of concern in the Framing era involved substantial force and coercion
of a type entirely absent in the covert surveillance in Jones, or the limited
intrusion at stake in Jardines, in which the information gleaned from the dog’s
alert was far narrower than could be obtained by the type of forcible physical
entry and physical search of concern in the Framing era.200
It may be desirable to treat unauthorized physical intrusions to obtain
information as searches subject to constitutional regulation under the Fourth
Amendment; indeed, some scholars have argued that Jones and Jardines are best
anchored not in original meaning but in a normative view regarding need to
regulate governmental trespass.201 It is doubtful, however, that this conclusion
can be fairly anchored in the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
4.

Knock-and-Announce

It is also striking how quickly even seemingly originalist doctrine lapses
into nonoriginalism. Consider the knock-and-announce requirement for
executing a search warrant derived from Framing-era common law and held to
be an aspect of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in Wilson v. Arkansas.202
Although Wilson was coded O, the subsequent cases in the study period applying
the requirement addressed claims of exigent circumstances, and while
mentioning the rule’s originalist origins, all were decided on nonoriginalist
grounds, without any claim that the holdings were dictated by original
meaning.203

198. For a helpful discussion of the inconclusive historical evidence regarding the Framing-era conception
of a “search,” see Kerr, supra note 182, at 71–76.
199. Brian Sawers, Original Misunderstandings: The Implications of Misreading History in Jones, 31 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 471, 490–510 (2015).
200. For a more extensive argument along these lines, see Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 919–25 (2014).
201. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Andrew Tutt, Offensive Searches: Toward a Two-Tier Theory of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 116–20 (2017) (arguing that Jones and
Jardines rest on protection of dignitarian interests infringed by governmental trespass); Laurent Sacharoff,
Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 917–20 (2014) (arguing that Jones and Jardines are best
understood to rest on a common-law approach to trespass sensitive to evolving norms).
202. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
203. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003) (officers seeking cocaine acted reasonably in
making forcible entry after announcing and waiting 15–20 seconds); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 68
(1998) (officers executing no-knock warrant for suspect believed to possess guns and drugs could break garage
window to accomplish covert entry); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388 (1997) (rejecting a blanket
exception to knock-and-announce rule in drug cases but holding that the unannounced entry in the case at bar
was properly premised on reasonable suspicion that Richards would destroy readily disposable drugs).
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The root of this difficulty is found in Wilson itself; the Court acknowledged
that “at the time of the framing, the common-law admonition that an officer
‘ought to signify the cause of his coming,’ had not been extended conclusively
to the context of felony arrests,” and only “gradually was applied to cases
involving felonies, but at the same time the courts continued to recognize that
under certain circumstances the presumption in favor of announcement
necessarily would give way to contrary considerations.”204 Thus, Wilson
acknowledged that the scope of the knock-and-announce requirement was
unclear at the time of framing and ratification. This is yet another example of
latent nonoriginalism, made evident by Wilson’s nonoriginalist progeny.
Perhaps Wilson’s account of the Framing-era understanding should not be
taken as accurate. Tracey Maclin has argued that the exceptions to the knockand-announce requirement were understood narrowly in the Framing era.205
Even so, it is unclear whether the Framing-era view has fair application today;
contemporary law enforcement faces exigencies little known in the Framing era.
At the founding, the most common form of judicially-authorized search was a
warrant to search for stolen goods.206 Today, officers frequently seek far more
readily disposable evidence,207 and the development of efficient firearms means
that officers executing warrants at present likely face far greater dangers than in
the Framing era.208
Thus, even if Wilson overstated the indeterminacy of the historical record,
there is good reason to believe that the Framing-era conception of the knockand-announce requirement offers little useful guidance for judges addressing
contemporary claims of exigency in an era of ubiquitous drug and gun crime. It
should therefore be unsurprising that originalism has been of little use in
determining the contemporary reach of the knock-and-announce requirement.

204. 514 U.S. at 935 (citation omitted) (quoting Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (Q.B. 1604)).
205. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment
History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 911–14 (2002).
206. E.g., Davies, supra note 121, at 16; Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the
History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 75–
76 (2013); Thomas, supra note 131, at 201. This remained the case even at the end of the nineteenth century.
See Oliver, supra note 131, at 402 n.104.
207. Cf. Richards, 520 U.S. at 395–96 (holding that forcible entry into motel room to execute warrant to
search for and seize drugs immediately after uniformed officers were observed by occupant was reasonable
“given the disposable nature of the drugs”).
208. Cf. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if a ‘frisk’ prior
to arrest would have been considered impermissible in 1791, perhaps it was considered permissible by 1868,
when the Fourteenth Amendment (the basis for applying the Fourth Amendment to the States) was adopted. Or
perhaps it is only since that time that concealed weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from
beyond arm’s reach have become common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the
original standard.”).
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO SCALLIAN ORIGINALISM
An originalist might respond to this study by contending that Justice
Scalia’s apparent inability to utilize originalist grounds of decision in the bulk
of Fourth Amendment cases reflects the defects of his approach to originalism
(and perhaps that of Justice Thomas as well). For example, originalist scholars
sometimes accused Justice Scalia of applying original meaning only in rule-like
form, rather than utilizing more abstract standards.209 This approach might be
expected to be particularly problematic when it comes to the constitutional
prohibition on “unreasonable” search and seizure. Others criticized Justice
Scalia for his willingness to resort to nonoriginalist balancing when he could
identify no Framing-era practice that reached the case before the Court.210 There
are considerable difficulties, however, in developing an alternative to Scalian
originalism that would be more helpful in deciding the cases in this study on
originalist grounds.
A. ANALOGY OR ADAPTATION
Some scholars, recognizing the perils of applying Framing-era rules to
contemporary circumstances, have argued that original meaning should not be
utilized through appropriation of Framing-era rules, but instead by a process of
analogical reasoning from historical precedent,211 or by adapting or “translating”
original meaning in light of altered historical context.212 Even Justice Scalia
indulged this approach on occasion; as we have seen, Kyllo rests on an effort to
adapt the Fourth Amendment to technological change.213 Yet, as Kyllo’s
contestable originalism demonstrates, analogical reasoning or adaptation
presents considerable difficulties.214 Examples of these difficulties, beyond
Kyllo itself, are plentiful.
1.

Warrantless Search and Seizure

Consider once again the difficulties with identifying an originalist rule for
when a search or seizure must be authorized by warrant. Those difficulties do
not disappear with the use of analogy or adaptation.
The seminal case upholding warrantless searches of vehicles was Carroll,
in which, as we have seen, the Court drew an analogy between Framing-era
customs searches of ships and contemporary searches of vehicles because both

209. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 41, at 11–12; Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483, 488–95 (2014).
210. See, e.g., Michael, supra note 91, at 918–19.
211. See, e.g., Strang, supra note 21, at 957 (arguing that originalists should utilize “analogy-warranting
rationales” when considering the relevance of Framing-era practice to contemporary adjudication).
212. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 82, at 1189–211 (arguing that fidelity to original meaning requires efforts
to adapt or “translate” original meaning in light of changes in historical context).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
214. See supra Subpart III.C.2.
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ships and vehicles are potentially mobile.215 Professor Davies rejected this
analogy, contending that customs searches of ships were not addressed by the
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure of only
“persons, houses, papers, and effects,” adding that in the Framing era, ships
“were not ordinary property at common law, but personalities subject to
admiralty law—a branch of civil law.”216 A customs inspection of a vessel’s
cargo, however, would seem to involve a search and seizure of “effects” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the text of which contains no exception
for search and seizure governed by admiralty law. But, even if this objection to
Carroll’s reasoning is set aside, the soundness of its analogy between ships and
vehicles, based on the potential mobility of each, is open to serious question.
As we have seen, we lack reliable historical evidence demonstrating that in
the Framing-era, other types of potentially mobile property, such as carts or
carriages, could be searched without a warrant.217 Moreover, in the Framing-era,
not only the “effects” found on potentially mobile ships, but also those found on
quite immobile commercial premises, could be searched without a warrant on
the view that there were the special governmental interests in facilitating
enforcement of customs, tax, and other regulatory laws at these locations.218
When these interests were at stake, there is Framing-era precedent for dispensing
with more than a warrant; the first Congress authorized not only customs
officials to board and inspect vessels, but also tax officials to enter and search
distilleries, without requiring warrants, probable cause, or even individualized
suspicion.219 Perhaps the particular governmental interests at stake in revenue
collection, rather than potential mobility, explain the Framing-era willingness to
dispense with a warrant in contexts involving revenue collection.220
Thus, an effort to utilize Framing-era customs searches of ships to lend
support for warrantless searches of automobiles based on the mobility of each is
imperfect; we cannot be confident that mobility was central to the Framing-era
tolerance for warrantless search and seizure. Yet, once this effort to equate
Framing-era customs searches and contemporary searches of vehicles is called

215. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48, 184.
216. Davies, supra note 80, at 605–06 & n.151.
217. See supra text accompanying note 187.
218. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 743–46; Davies, supra note 80, at 604–08.
219. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 53, 59 (1996); Arcila, supra note 121, at 1299–311; Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment,
21 GA. L. REV. 107, 112–15 (1986); cf. Cloud, supra note 119, at 1739–43 (arguing that these Framing-era
precedents were limited to regulatory contexts); Maclin, supra note 128, at 950–55 (same). See generally United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 583–84 (1983) (discussing the decision of the first Congress to
authorize inspections of vessels under the Fourth Amendment).
220. Cf. Davies, supra note 121, at 30–31 (“Revenue searches differed from criminal searches in two
important respects. First, because revenue was essential to the survival of the government, and thus an essential
public good, revenue searches likely were regarded as being more important . . . . Second, revenue enforcement
could not rely upon victim complaints to initiate prosecutions, as criminal justice did.”).
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into question, there is little evidence of any historically-fixed original meaning
of a “reasonable” search and seizure that provides an originalist understanding
of whether warrants are required to search vehicles or other potentially moveable
property.
2.

Exclusion

The same problem infects efforts to apply Framing-era conceptions to the
question of what remedy should be offered when evidence is obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As we have seen, the Framing-era regime
of tort liability may present unacceptable risks of over-deterrence in light of the
demands placed on contemporary law enforcement, and therefore seems illsuited for the present.221 Yet, contemporary tort remedies may be too
circumscribed to deter unreasonable search and seizure effectively; indeed, the
Supreme Court’s embrace of the exclusionary rule was based primarily on its
assessment that experience had demonstrated that damages remedies had proven
ineffective.222
Lawrence Lessig has argued that the exclusionary rule is now justified as a
faithful application of Framing-era principles in light of the inadequacy of
contemporary tort remedies.223 In contrast, Akhil Amar, while recognizing the
difficulties with the Framing-era regime and the threat of over-deterrence,
nevertheless opposed exclusion because of the lack of any Framing-era
precedent for a remedy that protects the guilty, and argued instead for a reformed
system of civil liability, including government-entity liability, class actions,
punitive damages, and injunctions against police misconduct.224 There are,
however, reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of these proposals; injunctive
decrees enforced by contempt sanctions against individual officials might
produce over-deterrence, and government-entity liability might have limited
deterrent effects on individual officers and perverse effects on government
budgets.225
However, one might assess the competing remedial regimes advanced by
Professors Lessig and Amar, the key point for present purposes is that this debate
cannot be resolved by reference to the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. After all, the Framing-era regime of robust personal tort liability
was utilized when there was no fair equivalent to modern police forces expected
to take proactive measures to keep the peace and investigate crime. There is no
obvious way to analogize or adapt this Framing-era regime to the present, when
many will regard it as critical that the threat of damages liability or other
sanctions does not unduly deter officers. The question whether exclusion has
become justifiable, despite the benefits it confers on the guilty, in light of the

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra Subpart III.A.3.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–57 (1961).
Lessig, supra note 82, at 1228–33.
AMAR, supra note 127, at 29–31, 40–43.
For a more elaborate discussion of these issues, see Rosenthal, supra note 148, at 558–60, 565–68.
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contemporary defects of the Framing-era regime personal tort liability and the
difficulties that inhere in alternative regimes of civil remedies cannot be
answered by mere reference to the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.226
3.

School and Other Special-Needs Searches

Similarly, consider again searches of public school students and other cases
involving special-needs searches. This is another Fourth Amendment problem
that does not readily yield to analogy or adaptation.
As we have seen, Justice Thomas once suggested an originalist approach
to school searches through the use of analogy, arguing that the Framing-era rule
of in loco parentis should be incorporated in the Fourth Amendment’s
conception of reasonableness, while Justice Scalia resisted this approach, noting
the advent of contemporary compulsory school attendance laws.227 There are
indeed formidable difficulties in analogizing between the Framing-era authority
of schools and contemporary public education.
When the relationship between parents and schools was entirely
contractual, a delegation of parental authority to school officials had substance,
and the exercise of that delegated authority by school officials to search students
in their care could plausibly be regarded as reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. When the relationship between parents and public schools
becomes largely a creature of statute, however, the fairness of any comparison
between an actual Framing-era contractual delegation of parental authority and
a contemporary implied-in-law statutory delegation, regardless of the parent’s
individual wishes—or her ability to finance an alternative education at a private
school—is doubtful. But, if one is persuaded that any effort to analogize to or
adapt the Framing-era concept of in loco parentis to contemporary school
searches is misguided, there does not seem to be any other Framing-era
conception that offers a better candidate for analogy or adaptation when it comes
to school searches. Nonoriginalism seems inevitable.
Other special-needs cases in this study also involve issues with no obvious
Framing-era antecedent, as we have seen.228 In these cases as well, no obvious
method analogy or adaptation present themselves.

226. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure
Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2299 (1998) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 127) (“[T]he argument about the
relative merits of the exclusionary rule and civil damages, like the argument about the warrant requirement, must
rest on judgments about systemic deterrence. What method of enforcement is most likely to make the ‘people . . .
secure’ from the threat of unreasonable searches and seizures at the least cost? Viewed in this way, the
exclusionary rule doubtless has problems, but there is once again more to say in its favor than Amar supposes.”).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 155–159.
228. See supra Subpart III.B.2.
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Cellphone Searches

Consider as well the question whether the digital contents of a modern
cellphone can be inspected as part of a search incident to an arrest. As we have
seen, although Riley discussed the historical basis for the search-incident-toarrest doctrine, its holding was grounded in a nonoriginalist balancing test.229
One might argue, however, that rummaging through the digital contents of a
cellphone is the modern equivalent of a general search condemned under the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This comparison, however, is
dubious. As Justice Scalia once noted, a search incident to a lawful arrest
importantly differs from a general search: “The fact of prior lawful arrest
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and distinguishes a search for
evidence of his crime from general rummaging.”230 Perhaps an arrest should not
be a sufficient basis for searching the contents of the arrestee’s cellphone, but
surely not because such a search is equivalent to the issuance of a general
warrant, unsupported by any particularized showing of wrongdoing.
One might also try to compare the search of a cellphone’s contents to a
search and seizure of “private papers,” which was condemned under the
Framing-era view that such searches infringed property rights.231 It is, however,
unclear that what came to be known as the “mere evidence” rule,232 is properly
assimilated within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the
Amendment’s text contains no absolute prohibition on the search or seizure of
persons, houses, papers or effects, but only a rule against their “unreasonable”
search and seizure.233 In any event, the mere evidence rule seems not to have
limited searches incident to a valid arrest in the Framing era. Under Framing-era
law, items in the possession of an arrestee were subject to search,234 and there is
no indication that this rule did not reach papers in an arrestee’s possession.235
Thus, although there may be good reason to condemn warrantless inspection of
the digital contents of a cellphone incident to arrest, a plausible rationale for that
conclusion is not found by simple analogy to or adaptation of the Framing-era

229. See supra text accompanying notes 162–165.
230. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
231. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy or
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309–16 (1998); Donohue, supra note 79, at 1308–13; Dripps, supra
note 119, at 1108–13; Thomas, supra note 131, at 221–23.
232. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300–10 (1967) (describing and ultimately repudiating the rule).
233. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 131, at 223 (observing that the mere evidence doctrine is “an odd
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which specifically mentions ‘papers’ as one of the items that,
presumably, could be described in a search warrant”).
234. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 751–53; TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 27–29, 39–46; Thomas,
supra note 166, at 1474–75.
235. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 206, at 108 (“There is, moreover, a powerful argument that the original
understanding did permit narrow, brief, and regulated seizures of papers. Search upon arrest was a familiar
feature of Founding-era practice, and was not challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds until after Boyd. I have
no specific instance of Founding-era seizures of papers incident to arrest, but likewise there is no known instance
of a court holding the seizure of papers from an arrested person to be unconstitutional.”).
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conception of unreasonable search and seizure.236
5.

Stop and Frisk

Or, consider Terry. As we have seen, Framing-era law did not recognize
authority to stop and frisk a suspect on suspicion, but often permitted a full
custodial arrest on suspicion under the night-walker statutes and their like.237
Today, reliance on Framing-era arrest authority is perilous. As we have seen, the
standard of probable cause has evolved in a way that more clearly distinguishes
it from suspicion,238 officers face a greatly reduced risk of personal liability in
tort,239 and statutes authorizing arrest on suspicion are now considered
impermissibly vague, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.240 How to
properly analogize or adapt the Framing-era conception of authority to detain
suspicious persons to contemporary search and seizure is far from clear.241
6.

Jones

As the preceding examples illustrate, the basic problem with an effort to
apply Framing-era understandings to far different contemporary search and
seizure controversies is the dubious nature of the entire enterprise. There is great
danger, as Stephen Griffin has observed, when “originalism depends on using
history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying
attention to historical context.”242 When one gives proper attention to context,
however, there may be no reliable means for analogizing or adapting Framingera understandings in a vastly different historical context.243 The past does not

236. Cf. id. at 108–09 (arguing for limitations on searches of digital evidence incident to arrest based on an
“anti-rummaging norm” resolving “the tension between Founding-era respect for papers and Founding-era
acceptance of search powers implied by lawful arrest”). Similarly, an effort to analogize warrantless inspection
of the potentially vast digital contents of a cellphone to a warrantless search of a home incident to an arrest leads
nowhere; as we have seen, Payton found inconclusive the historical evidence on whether a warrantless entry and
search of a home incident to arrest was permitted in the Framing era. See supra text accompanying notes 97–99.
This uncertainty persisted through the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. See, e.g., 1 BISHOP,
supra note 154, at §§ 194–99; CLARK, supra note 154, at 54. If anything, the weight of the historical evidence
suggests that forcible entry without a warrant was permitted to effect an arrest if the officer had adequate cause
to suspect that the suspect had committed a felony. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 80, at 642–45; Thomas, supra
note 131, at 231–34.
237. See supra Subpart III.B.4.
238. See supra Subpart III.A.1.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 135–143.
240. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (night-walking ordinance).
241. For more extensive discussions of the difficulties in adapting the Framing-era conception of arrest on
suspicion to contemporary search-and-seizure, see Dripps, supra note 119, at 1114–16; and Lawrence Rosenthal,
Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 330–37 (2010).
242. Griffin, supra note 82, at 1188.
243. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and
Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 591-92 (2000) (“At best the historical analogy furnishes a lesson that
may be applicable to a current problem. In the case of legal precedent, the cookie-cutter method will work
sometimes; some cases are undeniably identical in all conceivably relevant respects to previously decided cases.
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always contain neat parallels to the present.244
Justice Scalia, for one, grasped this point. In Jones, in response to Justice
Scalia’s reasoning that the attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle and its
subsequent monitoring was a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because, in the Framing-era, any physical occupation of the
property of another was regarded as a trespass,245 Justice Alito wrote: “[I]t is
almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to
what took place in this case,” such as when “a constable secreted himself
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor
the movements of the coach’s owner,” which “would have required either a
gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both.”246 It is hard to disagree. Indeed,
Justice Scalia responded: “[I]t is quite irrelevant whether there was an 18thcentury analog.”247 That conclusion seems inescapable for an originalist, at least
absent evidence that some methodology for conducting analogical reasoning or
adaptation was somehow baked into the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
B. DEFAULT RULES
Given the difficulties of applying Framing-era understandings to
contemporary litigation, one might be tempted to embrace a default rule. Some
originalist scholars, for example, argue that in light of the importance of
representative government to the constitutional structure, challenged legislative
or executive action should be presumed constitutional.248 Others, in contrast,
argue that the constitutional scheme’s regard for liberty justifies a presumption
in its favor and against the government.249 Since the Constitution contains no
text prescribing a rule for its interpretation, however, it is difficult to root any
type of default rule in original meaning.250 It is even more difficult to identify a
default rule lurking within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.251

But when they are merely ‘analogous,’ there is no metric of similarity that will enable a later case to be decided
by reference to a former one, just as there is no metric of similarity that would have enabled Lyndon Johnson to
figure out whether abandoning South Vietnam to her fate would have been ‘another Munich.’”).
244. For a useful discussion of the difficulties in adapting original meaning to changed circumstances, see
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 398–412 (1997).
245. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–11 (2012).
246. Id. at 420 & n.3 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
247. Id. at 406 n.3 (majority opinion).
248. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 21, at 699; Graglia, supra note 8, at 1044; Gary Lawson, Dead
Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234–35 (2012); Paulsen, supra note 7, at 2057.
249. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7, at 255–71; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies, and Jurisprudence:
Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1070–76 (1990).
250. To be sure, a default rule might be characterized as originalist if it reflected the original methods used
to interpret the Constitution. Indeed, some have defended something like a presumption of constitutionality as
reflecting the Framing-era approach to judicial review, although a comprehensive survey of Framing-era
jurisprudence casts considerable doubt on this view. See William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before
Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 560–62 (2005).
251. For a more general argument against the originalist credentials of default rules, see Solum, supra note
14, at 511–23.
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Because the Fourth Amendment is a limitation on governmental powers, it
is hard to characterize it as reflecting some form of default in favor of legislative
or executive action.252 To be sure, the Fourth Amendment only prohibits
“unreasonable” search and seizure, but this is no default rule; it is a function of
the unadorned text, making no use of historical evidence of original meaning.
One could imagine a default rule limited to a proscription against search
and seizures of the type understood to be forbidden in the Framing era. For
example, some originalists have argued that because, in the Framing era,
concerns about search and seizure were largely confined to searches of
residences pursuant to inadequately particularized warrants, a contemporary
Fourth Amendment should parallel that concern, without other types of search
and seizure left unregulated.253 In the Framing era, however, officers acting
without warrants had much less authority and much greater exposure to tort
liability than at present.254 Thus, it is problematic to limit Fourth Amendment
protections to only those practices thought unreasonable in a different historical
context.255
Confining the Fourth Amendment to a prohibition on general warrants not
only produces a prohibition narrower than reflected in the ratified text, but it also
neglects the possibility that the Fourth Amendment is not properly read to be
inapplicable to regimes of search and seizure that the Framing generation might
not have anticipated.256 Indeed, because constitutional text is generally framed
more broadly than its original expected applications, most originalists draw a
distinction between the original meaning of constitutional text and its original
expected applications, and regard only the former as interpretively binding.257
252. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill
of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”).
253. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV.
817, 833–55 (1989) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is confined to a prohibition on general warrants); David
E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1083–
95 (2004) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment prevents only entry of houses with a general warrant or no
warrant).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 122–142.
255. For a more elaborate argument along these lines, see Davies, supra note 80, at 740–44.
256. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 772 (“Having uprooted the paramount cause of the incidents of
unreasonable search and seizure with which they were familiar, the generation of the Fourth Amendment had
little reason to foresee that devices other than the general warrant would someday imperil the right they sought
to protect.”); Davies, supra note 80, at 552 (“The modern interpretation of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’
is the product of post-framing developments that the Framers did not anticipate. During the nineteenth century,
courts and legislatures responded to heightened concerns about crime and disorder by expanding peace officers’
ex officio authority to arrest and search. That expansion marginalized warrant authority and thus undercut the
premises that had led the Framers to believe that they could control the officer by controlling the warrant.”).
257. BALKIN, supra note 7, at 6–14; Barnett, supra note 21, at 410; Berman, supra note 86, at 385–89;
Calabresi & Fine, supra note 21, at 668–72; Green, supra note 86, at 580–82; McConnell, supra note 7, at 1284–
87; Paulsen, supra note 7, at 2059–62; Rotunda, supra note 7, at 513–14; Ryan, supra note 86, at 1539–46;
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 935 (2009). For
examples of Justice Scalia’s embrace of this approach, see supra text accompanying notes 82–90.
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The original expected application of the Fourth Amendment may have been
confined to general warrants and their like, but its text is inconsistent with the
conclusion that only a general warrant could produce “unreasonable searches
and seizures.”258
Conversely, given that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
“unreasonable” search and seizure, it is equally hard to characterize the Fourth
Amendment as reflecting a presumption against the constitutionality of any type
of search or seizure not endorsed by Framing-era practice. This view neglects
the possibility that new demands on law enforcement might render reasonable
methods regarded as unreasonable in the Framing era; for example, as we have
seen, the development of efficient firearms might bolster the case for the
reasonableness of investigative stop and frisk.259
In short, no default rule looks very promising as an originalist approach to
the Fourth Amendment.260
C. ORIGINAL MEANING AT HIGHER LEVELS OF GENERALITY
Another originalist response to the difficulties of applying historical
evidence of original meaning to contemporary issues of search and seizure law
is to state original meaning at a sufficiently high level of generality.
Many originalists argue that original meaning should be stated at the level
of generality found in the pertinent constitutional text.261 On this view, in light

258. Cf. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 99–124 (2005) (arguing that when a constitutional provision is directed at a paradigmatic evil, it should be
understood as a commitment to prohibit the evil that gave it rise, without precluding an interpretation that
proscribes additional practices within the ambit of the text).
259. See supra text accompanying note 169.
260. A type of originalist default rule is suggested by Michael Mannheimer’s view that in light of the
character of the antifederalist objections to the original Constitution that produced the Fourth Amendment, it
should be understood to require simply that federal officials comply with state law when undertaking search and
seizure. Mannheimer, supra note 91, at 1263–87. It is unclear, however, whether this rule qualifies as originalist;
it hardly seems likely that the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning would have required federal officials to
obey a state law that prohibited them from undertaking inspections or searches to enforce federal customs or tax
laws. Indeed, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court found the evidence that the Fourth Amendment
was understood in the Framing era to require compliance with state law inconclusive. See Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164, 168–71 (2008). Professor Mannheimer acknowledges the indeterminacy of the historical evidence
and defends his proposal as an instance where “constitutional interpretation must give way to constitutional
construction, ‘and the meaning of the text must be determined rather than found.’” Mannheimer, supra note 91,
at 1285 (quoting BARNETT, supra note 7, at 120). For that reason, his proposal more likely reflects nonoriginalist
construction than fixation and constraint. Moreover, if the Fourth Amendment is deemed applicable to search
and seizure by state and local officials by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no evidence that the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment required only that state or local officials comply with state law,
and Professor Mannheimer advances no such argument. See id. at 1234 n.6. The historical evidence of the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, as we have seen, offers little support for the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment did no more than require that search and seizure be undertaken in compliance with
applicable state law. See supra note 154.
261. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 7, at 12–63; BORK, supra note 9, at 149; Barnett, supra note 41, at 23;
McConnell, supra note 7, at 1280.
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of the level of generality reflected in the prohibition on “unreasonable searches
and seizures,” the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment could properly be
stated at quite a high level of generality.262 Indeed, some originalists have
approached the Fourth Amendment in this way, arguing that its original meaning
is properly stated in terms of a concern about excessive discretion exercised by
law enforcement officials,263 unwarranted governmental intrusions,264 undue
threats to individual liberty and privacy,265 reasonableness,266 individualized
suspicion,267 or as one scholar put it, combining related themes, “preserving
judicial oversight, constraining discretion, and sacrificing individual privacy
only to the extent necessary.”268
Stating original meaning at such a high level of generality, however, is
inevitably reductive; one cannot generalize about original meaning without
losing important qualifications reflected in the historical evidence.269 For
example, characterizing the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment in terms
of excessive discretion overlooks the fact that both the night-walker laws and
warrantless inspections of ships and commercial premises involved a good deal
of enforcement discretion, and seem to have been regarded as within the original
ambit of lawful search-and-seizure authority.270 Stating original meaning in
terms of “reasonableness” overlooks the fact that Framing-era law never
employed a test for search and seizure framed in those terms, but instead asked
whether an official sued in tort had acted within the scope of his lawful duties.271

262. For a general discussion of the difficulties originalists face when endeavoring to select the appropriate
level of generality at which to state the original meaning of constitutional text, see Peter J. Smith, Originalism
and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 532–49 (2017).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69–73 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Michael,
supra note 91, at 919–22.
264. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 231, at 350–66; Donohue, supra note 79, at 1314–28.
265. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 119, at 1128–30; Thomas, supra note 166, at 1463–78.
266. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 127, at 10–20.
267. See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 128, at 45–54; Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion
in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 526–31 (1995).
268. SCHULHOFER, supra note 126, at 177. To similar effect, see GRAY, supra note 78, at 168 (“Most
founding-era readers would have read the reasonableness clause as commanding future governments not to
injure or infringe upon the collective right of the people to live free from fear that their living spaces would be
explored, their written and printed materials looked through or taken, their personal property examined or
taken, and their persons sought, examined, or restrained for no reason, for insufficient reasons, for illegitimate
reasons, or based solely on the unfettered discretion of executive agents acting beyond the reach of effective
judicial constraint or review.”).
269. Cf. Davies, supra note 80, at 745 (“[E]xtracting any ‘principle’ from a text that was written within the
larger structure of common-law concepts and doctrines is inherently reductionist . . . .”); Graglia, supra note 8,
at 1044 (“Originalism cannot realistically be said to restrain judges if it requires no more than that they be able
to identify a principle or ‘value’ the ratifiers wanted to protect. Many principles or values are protected by the
Constitution, and they necessarily come into conflict. None of them is or can be protected absolutely.”).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 167–168, 217–220.
271. See, e.g., Arcila, supra note 134, at 394–423; Cloud, supra note 119, at 1732–43; Davies, supra note
80, at 571–90; Donohue, supra note 79, at 1185–92; David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth
Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 586–94 (2008); Nikolaus Williams, Note, The Supreme Court’s
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A focus on individualized suspicion overlooks the fact that the Framing-era
conception permitted suspicionless search and seizure when governmental
interests regarded as particularly strong were at stake, as in the case of searches
of ships, distilleries, and other commercial premises.272
Even more important, when original meaning is stated in terms of relatively
general standards, original meaning ceases to do much, if any, analytical work.
If original meaning is characterized in terms of excessive discretion, undue
intrusion or threat to liberty or privacy, or simply reasonableness, then any
distinction between original and contemporary meaning becomes of little
significance. Instead, a prudential judgment is required about whether, under
contemporary circumstances, there is adequate justification for whatever level
of discretion, intrusion, or limitation on liberty or privacy is at stake. When
original meaning is stated so capaciously, the distinction between originalism
and nonoriginalism becomes vanishingly small. Constitutional adjudication is
instead driven by a contemporary assessment of the costs and benefits of search
and seizure.273
Thus, once one divorces the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment
from Framing-era practice, the difference between originalism and
nonoriginalism seems to disappear. If one simply defines original meaning as a
prohibition on “unreasonable” search and seizure without tying reasonableness
to Framing-era practice, one winds up reading the Fourth Amendment in
contemporary terms, without need of original meaning. For example, consider
again Wilson’s originalist justification for a knock-and-announce requirement.
If evidence of Framing-era practice is not dispositive, then one wonders what
originalism adds to the case for a Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce
requirement. One hardly needs historical evidence of original meaning to
conclude that an unannounced forcible entry without some rational justification
is “unreasonable;” without justification, a forcible entry produces unnecessary
property damage and an unwarranted risk of violent confrontation.274 Thus,
stating original meaning at a high level of generality is likely of little aid when
addressing disputed questions of Fourth Amendment law. Perhaps the reason
that Justice Scalia focused on Framing-era rules was that original meaning,

Ahistorical Reasonableness Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1522, 1535–54 (2014).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 217–220.
273. For helpful, if more general, discussions of the way originalists, by stating original meaning at a high
level of generality, collapse the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism, see Segall, supra note 13,
at 432–33; and Smith, supra note 262, at 549–56.
274. Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Many homeowners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When a woman sees a strange man, in plain clothes, prying
up her bedroom window and climbing in, her natural impulse would be to shoot. A plea of justifiable homicide
might result awkwardly for enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a gun being drawn on him might shoot
first. Under the circumstances of this case, I should not want the task of convincing a jury that it was not murder.
I have no reluctance in condemning as unconstitutional a method of law enforcement so reckless and so fraught
with danger and discredit to the law enforcement agencies themselves.”).
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stated at a high level of generality, offered little help when it came to deciding
the cases before him.
CONCLUSION
In his extrajudicial writing, Justice Scalia sometimes advanced what he
seemed to regard as the originalist clincher: “The conclusive argument in favor
of originalism,” he wrote (with a co-author), is that “[i]t is the only objective
standard of interpretation even competing for acceptance.”275 Or, as he put it on
another occasion: “You can’t beat somebody with nobody.”276 In this regard,
Justice Scalia might have been a bit uncharitable; scholars have offered a variety
of approaches to constitutional adjudication beyond original meaning that offer
some hope of objectivity.277 In any event, this study suggests that nonoriginalism
is inescapable; original meaning simply does not provide an answer in most
cases before the Supreme Court, at least when it comes to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Some alternative to originalism is essential if the Court is to do
its work. Originalism likely offers meaningful guidance in only a small fraction
of the kind of the cases that reach the Supreme Court.
One might believe, however, that the Fourth Amendment presents unusual
difficulties for originalism. Perhaps it is framed at an unusually high level of
generality, or the historical evidence of its original meaning is unusually
indeterminate, that therefore this study has produced results not generalizable to
other areas of constitutional law. There is, however, reason to think that the
Fourth Amendment is typical of the kind of constitutional provisions likely to
come before the Supreme Court.
Highly determinate text is unlikely to generate litigation; no one needs a
court to decide whether a teenager can serve in the House of Representatives.278
Open-ended constitutional text is more likely to produce litigation, and in this
respect, the Fourth Amendment is hardly unique. As Thomas Colby put it: “Our
Constitution . . . with its short list of lofty guarantees like ‘equal protection of
the laws,’ ‘freedom of speech,’ and ‘due process of law’—is objectively openended in many instances.”279 Thus, the Fourth Amendment may be typical of

275. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 89.
276. Scalia, supra note 8, at 855.
277. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991) (describing textual,
historical, ethical, structural, prudential, and doctrinal arguments); Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the
Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145, 182–85 (2018) (describing
arguments from text, structure, purposes, consequences, judicial precedent, political convention, customs,
natural law or rights, national ethos, political tradition, and honored authority); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–209 (1987)
(describing arguments from text, the Framers’ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and values or policies).
278. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty five Years . . . .”).
279. Colby, supra note 13, at 725 (footnotes omitted); accord, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Philosophy of
Language, Linguistics, and Possible Lessons about Originalism, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION:
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“the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights.”280 Open-ended text, however,
will often lack anything like a crystal-clear original meaning; for example, there
is something approaching consensus among legal scholars that the original
meaning of the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech is
unclear.281
There is also reason to believe that the difficulties in applying historical
evidence of the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning are typical. As we have
seen, the original semantic meaning of the Constitution’s text may not often
differ from its contemporary meaning; the English language has not changed
markedly since the Constitution’s framing.282 Accordingly, as reflected in
Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism, original meaning often must be
derived not by recovering archaic definitions of the words in the Constitution,
but instead from evidence of the historical context in which the Constitution’s
text was framed and understood.283 Yet, as reflected in the difficulties that
Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism encountered, applying
contextual evidence of original meaning, divorced from its historical context,
presents great difficulties. Original meaning rarely has a neat and tidy
application to the issues that arise in contemporary litigation.
Consider what may be the leading instance in which originalists claim that
the nonoriginalist jurisprudence has departed from original meaning—the
Fourteenth Amendment. Many have argued that the Supreme Court erred by

WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 46, 63 (Brian
G. Slocum ed., 2017) (“Many key constitutional provisions are cast in highly open-ended language; that in itself
can greatly influence how far the text will provide answers to specific circumstances.”). For an effort by two
leading originalist scholars to demonstrate that the Constitution contains many relatively open-ended standards
beyond the Fourth Amendment, see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 209, at 496–504.
280. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
281. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941) (“The framers of the First
Amendment make it plain that they regarded freedom of speech as very important . . . . But they say very little
about its exact meaning.”); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 281 (1985) (“[W]e do not know
what the First Amendment’s freedom of speech-and-press clause meant to the men who drafted and ratified it at
the time that they did so. Moreover, they [were] themselves at that time sharply divided and possessed no distinct
understanding either.”); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN AMERICA 23 (1991) (“[I]t is simply impossible to turn to discussions by the framers . . . for definitive
answers on the scope of freedom of the press.”); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN
WARTIME 42 (2004) (“[T]he framers of the First Amendment . . . . embraced a broad and largely undefined
constitutional principle, not a concrete, well-settled legal doctrine.”); STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 52 (“[T]he
actual views of the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment are in many ways unclear.”); Lillian R. BeVier,
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 299, 307 (1978) (“History tells us little . . . about the precise meaning contemplated by those who drafted
the Bill of Rights.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
22 (1971) (“The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech . . . .”); Jud Campbell, Natural
Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 307 (2017) (“[I]t remains debatable whether the Speech
and Press Clauses directly recognized ordinary natural rights, a set of more determinate legal rights, or both.”);
Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of
Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (2011) (“[T]he evidence regarding the original meaning of the Speech and Press
Clauses is anything but easy to sort out.”).
282. See supra text accompanying note 70.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 72–77.
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incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause,284 claiming instead that the original meaning
of its Privileges or Immunities Clause285 protected the individual rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and perhaps other rights regarded as
fundamental, against abridgement by the states.286 There is also, however,
substantial historical evidence that the original understanding of due process
included protection for substantive, if unenumerated, rights that were regarded
as fundamental.287 In any event, an originalist approach to the Fourteenth

284. For opinions making the case against due process incorporation, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742, 810–12 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); and Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63–66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
285. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”).
286. See AMAR, supra note 154, at 163–80 (fundamental rights including the Bill of Rights); CHESTER
JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 56–67, 85–89 (1997) (same);
BALKIN, supra note 7, at 190–219 (same); BARNETT, supra note 7, at 60–68, 326–37 (unjustified infringements
on liberty); JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 251–63 (1997) (fundamental rights); KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 277–300 (2014) (enumerated personal
constitutional rights); Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, 1309–24 (2009) (fundamental rights including the Bill of Rights); Michael Kent Curtis,
Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United
States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1145–51 (2000) (same); Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 351, 395–417 (1997) (natural and common-law rights);
Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1583–620 (2007) (protecting at least the Bill of Rights). To be
sure, the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated substantive rights such as the Bill of Rights is not
unassailable; the evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was widely understood in the Framing era to impose
the Bill of Rights against the states is thin and its ratification produced no discernable movement toward
imposing the Bill of Rights against the States. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 68–134 (1949); Lawrence
Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem
of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 385–400 (2009); see also Philip Hamburger, Privileges or
Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 122–34 (2011) (finding the evidence ambiguous).
287. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 324–38 (1999) (discussing the meaning of due process
and explaining why “due process” refers to a “more encompassing protection of personal liberty”); Frederick
Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 654–63 (2009) (finding historical evidence
that supports a broad substantive understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Robert E.
Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 943–63 (1990) (same); Ryan C. Williams, The
One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE. L.J. 408, 460–90 (2010) (“Modern scholars who
have surveyed the pre-Civil War case law for themselves have almost uniformly concluded that support for
substantive due process in the antebellum era was far stronger than . . . critics of the doctrine had
acknowledged.”). But cf. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012) (arguing that due process prevented the legislature from exercising judicial powers
or abrogating common-law procedural protections).
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Amendment might protect only the specific “due process” rights or “privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States” recognized as fundamental at the
time of framing and ratification.288 The Fourteenth Amendment’s text, however,
is written at a higher level of generality; freezing “due process” and “privileges
or immunities” as of 1868 may well amount to no more than preserving the
original expected applications of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the
original meaning of its open-ended text. Once original expected applications are
rejected as the basis for constitutional adjudication, however, all the
disagreements about identifying and protecting fundamental rights in a
contemporary context—such as those confronted by the Court in
Obergefell289—reemerge in originalist garb, even if Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence were reformed along originalist lines.290 Originalism, in short,
may be no more determinate for the Fourteenth Amendment than the Fourth.
Of course, despite the foregoing, it is possible that some version of Fourth
Amendment originalism might be devised that offers greater determinacy than
the approaches considered above, or that the Fourth Amendment is atypical, and
that original meaning could prove more useful in addressing the kind of cases
that reach the Supreme Court under other constitutional provisions. This,
however, is ultimately an empirical question. If originalists are serious about the
theorized virtues of their preferred adjudicative methodology, it is time they
undertook the empirical work necessary to prove themselves right, not by
discussing their favorite, cherry-picked cases, but by demonstrating that
originalism is a practicable method of constitutional adjudication in the broad
range of cases.
In a published tribute to the jurist he later replaced, Justice Scalia’s
successor endorsed originalism, writing that judges should “strive (if humanly
and so imperfectly) to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward.”291
This study suggests that if judges only look backward, searching for original
meaning, they may not be able to do their jobs.

288. For an example of this approach, see generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
290. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of Chicago’s
Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights, 115 PENN ST. L. REV.
561, 591 (2011) (“[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause provides no more real guidance to its use than . . .
the Due Process Clause. In fact, if the best that can be said of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that its
protection is limited to ‘fundamental rights,’ then it sounds suspiciously like the Court’s interpretation of
the Due Process Clause.”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Bagley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage,
70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016) (advancing an originalist argument against the constitutionality of bans on
same-sex marriage).
291. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 906 (2016).
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APPENDIX
Case

Code

Comments

Colorado v. Bertine (1987)
479 U.S. 367
Majority: (Rehnquist, White,
Blackmun, Powell, Stevens,
O’Connor, Scalia)

NO

Concurrence: (Blackmun,
Powell, O’Connor)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan)

NO
Maryland v. Garrison (1987)
480 U.S. 79

Majority: (Stevens, Rehnquist,
White, Powell, O’Connor,
Scalia)

NOBOMC

Coded primary issue: whether the execution of
the warrant violated respondent's constitutional
right to be secure in his home.

Dissent: (Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall)

NOBOMC

Coded primary issue: whether the execution of
the warrant violated respondent's constitutional
right to be secure in his home.

United States v. Dunn (1987)
480 U.S. 294
Majority: (White, Rehnquist,
Blackmun, Powell, Stevens,
O’Connor, Scalia [all but
paragraph 3 of part II].)

O

Makes reference to the common law concept of
curtilage.

Concurrence: (Scalia)

O

Scalia coded as joining the majority.

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall)

NO
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Arizona v. Hicks (1987)
480 U.S. 321
Majority: (Scalia, Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens)

NO

Concurrence: (White)

NO

Dissent: (Powell, Rehnquist,
O’Connor)

NO

Dissent: (O’Connor, Rehnquist,
Powell)

NO

Illinois v. Krull, (1987)
480 U.S. 340
Majority: (Blackmun,
Rehnquist, White, Powell,
Scalia)

NO

Marshall coded as joining J. O’Connor’s
dissent.
Dissent: (Marshall)

Dissent: (O’Connor, Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens)

NOBOMC

Mentioned that the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment included a prohibition on
statutes that authorized unreasonable search and
seizure, but the actual issue in the case was
whether the exclusionary rule should be used as
a remedy in such case.
NOBOMC
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O'Connor v. Ortega (1987)
480 U.S. 709
Coded primary issue: whether the search of an
employee’s office was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
Plurality: (O’Connor,
Rehnquist, White, Powell)

Concurrence: (Scalia)

NOBOMC
There is discussion of the Framing-era concern
for places of work, however, the plurality
employs a nonoriginalist balancing test to
decide the case.

NO

Coded primary issue: whether the search of an
employee’s office was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.

Dissent: (Blackmun, Brennan.
Marshall, Stevens)

NOBOMC

There is discussion of the Framing-era concern
for places of work, however, the dissent
employs a nonoriginalist balancing test.

New York v. Burger (1987)
482 U.S. 691
Majority: (Blackmun,
Rehnquist, White, Powell,
Stevens, Scalia)

NO

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall,
O’Connor)

NO
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Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987)
483 U.S. 868
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist,
White, Powell, O’Connor)

NO

Dissent: (Blackmun, Marshall,
Brennan [1-B, 1-C], Stevens [IC])

NO

Dissent: (Stevens, Marshall)

NO

California v. Greenwood (1988)
486 U.S. 35
(Sans Kennedy)
Majority: (White, Rehnquist,
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor,
Scalia)

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall)

NO

Kennedy took no part in this opinion.

O

Dissent relies on Oliver v. U.S. and Boyd v.
U.S., stating that "at common law, the curtilage
is the area to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life.’”

Michigan v. Chesternut (1988)
486 U.S. 567

Majority: (Blackmun,
Unanimous)

NO

Concurrence: (Kennedy, Scalia)

NO
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Murray v. United States (1988)
487 U.S. 533
(Sans Brennan and Kennedy)
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist,
White, Blackmun)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Stevens,
O’Connor)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens)

NO

Coded as majority; Brennan and Kennedy took
no part in this opinion.

Florida v. Riley (1989)
488 U.S. 445
Plurality: (White, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Kennedy)

O

References the common-law concept of
curtilage in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986).

Concurrence: (O’Connor)

O

References the common-law concept of
curtilage in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986).

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshal,
Stevens)

NO

Dissent: (Blackmun)

NO

Brower v. County of Inyo (1989)
489 U.S. 593
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist,
White, O’Connor, Kennedy

Concurrence: (Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun)

O

NO

References the general warrants issued by Lord
Halifax in the 1760's and writs of assistance.

142

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (1989)
489 U.S. 602

Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist,
White, Blackmun, O’Connor,
Scalia, Stevens [All but Part III])

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan)

NO

National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989)
489 U.S. 656

Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist,
White, Blackmun, O’Connor)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan)

NO

Dissent: (Scalia, Stevens)

NO

United States v. Sokolow (1989)
490 U.S. 1

Majority: (Rehnquist, White,
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan)

NO

[Vol. 70:75
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Graham v. Connor (1989)
490 U.S. 386
Majority: (Rehnquist, White,
Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy)

NO

Concurrence: (Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall)

NO

James v. Illinois (1990)
493 U.S. 307
Majority: (Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens)

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens)

NO

Dissent: (Kennedy, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia)

NO

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990)
494 U.S. 259
Majority: (Rehnquist, White,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy)

O

Concurrence: (Kennedy)

O

References the drafting history of the Fourth
Amendment, along with the Federalist Papers.
Kennedy coded as joining the majority.

Concurring in the judgment:
(Stevens)

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall)

Dissent: (Blackmun)

NO

O

NO

References the drafting history of the Fourth
Amendment.
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Maryland v. Buie (1990)
494 U.S. 325
Majority: (White. Rehnquist,
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy)

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens)

NO

Concurrence: (Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall)

NO

Florida v. Wells (1990)
495 U.S. 1
Majority: (Rehnquist, White,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy)

NO

Concurrence: (Brennan,
Marshall)

NO

Concurrence: (Blackmun)

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens)

NO
New York v. Harris (1990)
495 U.S. 14

Majority: (White, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy)

Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan,
Blackmun, Stevens)

NOBOMC

References the overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in
our traditions since the origins of the Republic
cited in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980), but the actual issue in the case was
whether the exclusionary rule should be used as
a remedy in such case.
Bases the dissent on the history of privacy and
sanctity in one’s home, citing Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).

O
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Minnesota v. Olson (1990)
495 U.S. 91

Majority: (White, Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy)

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens)

NO

Concurrence: (Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Rehnquist)

Vote not coded; dissented without opinion.

Dissent: (Blackmun)

Vote not coded; dissented without opinion.
Horton v. California (1990)
496 U.S. 128

Majority: (Stevens, Rehnquist,
White, Blackmun, O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall)

NO

Alabama v. White (1990)
496 U.S. 325

Majority: (White, Rehnquist,
Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall)

NO

145
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Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990)
496 U.S. 444

Majority: (Rehnquist, White,
Connor, Scalia, Kennedy)

NO

Concurrence: (Blackmun)

NO

Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens, Brennan
[Parts I & II], Marshall [Parts I
& II])

NO

Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990)
497 U.S. 177

Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist,
White, Blackmun, O’Connor,
Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan,
Stevens)

NO

[Vol. 70:75
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California v. Hodari D. (1991)
499 U.S. 621
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist,
White, Blackmun, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter)

Dissent: (Stevens, Marshall)

O

References the common-law understanding of
the word “seizure.”

NOBOMC

Acknowledges the common-law understanding
of “seizure,” but believes the Fourth
Amendment is not rigidly confined by ancient
common-law precept.

City of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991)
500 U.S. 44
Majority: (O’Connor,
Rehnquist, White, Kennedy,
Souter)
Dissent: (Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens)

NO

Coded primary issue: whether the county's
policy for providing post-arrest judicial
determinations of probable cause complied with
the Fourth Amendment.

O

Agreeing with Scalia dissent.
Refers to the common-law traditions of arrest
and prompt hearings.

Dissent: (Scalia)

O
Endorsed a twenty-four-hour presumptive
hearing requirement not based on original
meaning.
Florida v. Jimeno (1991)
500 U.S. 248

Majority: (Rehnquist, White,
Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Stevens)

NO
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California v. Acevedo (1991)
500 U.S. 565
Majority: (Blackmun,
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter)

Concurrence: (Scalia)

NOBOMC

References Carroll’s discussion of Framing-era
law
Bases decision on the traditional common-law
warrant requirement.

O

Agreeing with most of Stevens’s dissent.
Dissent: (White)

NOBOMC

Dissent: (Stevens, Marshall)

NOBOMC

Provides background on the Fourth Amendment
explaining the Framers' direct constitutional
response to the unreasonable law enforcement
practices.

Florida v. Bostick (1991)
501 U.S. 429

Majority: (O’Connor,
Rehnquist, White, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter)

NO

Dissent: (Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens)

NO

Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois (1992)
506 U.S. 56

Majority: (unanimous, White)

NOBOMC

References the history of sanctity in one’s
home, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980).
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Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993)
508 U.S. 366
Majority: (unanimous, White
[Parts I and II])

NO

Majority: White [Parts III and
IV], Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter)

NO

Concurrence: (Scalia)

Concurring in Part/Dissenting in
Part: (Rehnquist, Blackmun,
Thomas)

NOBOMC

References the common-law view of stop and
frisk to determine constitutionality of the frisk,
but acknowledges that constitutionality of the
“frisk” in the present case was neither
challenged nor argued.

NO

Powell v. Nevada (1994)
511 U.S. 79

Majority: (Ginsburg, Blackmun,
Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter)

NO

Dissent: (Thomas, Rehnquist)

NO
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Arizona v. Evans (1995)
514 U.S. 1
Majority: (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Breyer)

NO

Concurrence: (O’Connor,
Souter, Breyer)

NO

Concurrence: (Souter, Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens)

NOBOMC

References the use of general warrants to search
for evidence of violations of the Crown's
revenue laws and how outraged the authors of
the Bill of Rights were, but ultimately employs
a cost-benefit analysis.
Not coded because it did not discuss the Fourth
Amendment.

Dissent: (Ginsburg, Stevens)

Wilson v. Arkansas (1995)
514 U.S. 927
Majority: (unanimous, Thomas)

Bases decision on the common law knock-andannounce principle.

O

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995)
515 U.S. 646

Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer)

NOBOMC

References the Framing-era rule that schools
could exercise parental rights, but adds that
because we now have compulsory attendance
laws, that approach should not be used, and
instead applies a nonoriginalist balancing test.

Concurrence: (Ginsburg)

NOBOMC

Ginsburg coded as joining the majority opinion.

O

Bases decision on historical evidence explaining
why the Framers believed general warrants were
“intolerable and unreasonable”.

Dissent: (O’Connor, Stevens,
Souter)

Whren v. United States (1996)
517 U.S. 806

Majority: (unanimous, Scalia)

NO
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Ohio v. Robinette (1996)
519 U.S. 33

Majority: (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Breyer)

NO

Concurrence: (Ginsburg)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens)

NO

Coded primary issue: whether the Fourth
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized
defendant must be advised that he is “free to go”
before his consent to search will be recognized
as voluntary.

Coded primary issue: whether the Fourth
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized
defendant must be advised that he is “free to go”
before his consent to search will be recognized
as voluntary.

Maryland v. Wilson (1997)
519 U.S. 408
Majority: (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens, Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Kennedy)

NO
Chandler v. Miller (1997)
520 U.S. 305

Majority: (Ginsburg, Stevens,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Rehnquist)

NO

Richards v. Wisconsin (1997)
520 U.S. 385

Majority: (unanimous, Stevens)

NOBOMC

References the common-law knock-andannounce principle and acknowledges that the
common law believed individuals should be
provided the opportunity to comply with the law
and to avoid the destruction of property
occasioned by a forcible entry, but dispenses
with the requirement given the circumstances.
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United States v. Ramirez (1998)
523 U.S. 65

Majority: (unanimous,
Rehnquist)

Coded primary issue: whether the Fourth
Amendment holds officers to a higher standard
than reasonable suspicion when a “no-knock”
entry results in the destruction of property.
NOBOMC
References the common law knock and
announce principle, but bases its decision on the
reasonableness of the officers’ actions.

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott (1998)
524 U.S. 357

Majority: (Thomas, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens)

NO

Dissent: (Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer)

NO
Minnesota v. Carter (1998)
525 U.S. 83

Majority: (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas)

Concurrence: (Scalia, Thomas)

Concurrence: (Kennedy)

NO

O

Examines and bases decision on Founding-era
materials for the understood meaning of “their
…houses.”

NOBOMC

References historical evidence and makes note
that the interpretation of the English authorities
that were the historical basis for the Fourth
Amendment are disputed.

Concurrence: (Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Ginsburg, Stevens,
Souter)

NO
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Knowles v. Iowa (1998)
525 U.S. 113

Majority: (unanimous,
Rehnquist)

NO

Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)
526 U.S. 295
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas,
Breyer)

O

Cites to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) to show that, historically, warrantless
searches of containers, within an automobile,
are reasonable.

Concurrence: (Breyer)

O

Breyer coded as joining the majority opinion.

Dissent: (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg)

NO

Florida v. White (1999)
526 U.S. 559

Majority: (Thomas, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Breyer)

O

Relies on the holding in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), which mentions
that warrantless searches of vessels, wagons,
and carriages were historically viewed as
reasonable.

Concurrence: (Souter, Breyer)

O

Breyer and Souter coded as joining the majority
opinion.

Dissent: (Stevens, Ginsburg)

NOBOMC
Wilson v. Layne (1999)
526 U.S. 603

Majority: (unanimous,
Rehnquist [Parts I and II])

O

Majority: (Rehnquist [Part III],
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer)

O

Concurring in Part, Dissenting in
Part (Stevens)

O

Bases decision on the centuries-old principle of
respect for the privacy of the home and the
common-law tradition of parties directly aiding
in the execution of the warrant.
Coded as agreeing with the majority on the
Fourth Amendment issue.

Coded as agreeing with the majority on the
Fourth Amendment issue.
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Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)
528 U.S. 119
Majority: (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas)
Concurring in Part, Dissenting in
Part: (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer)

NO

NOBOMC

Rejects Illinois's reliance on the common-law
view that flight from an offense carries with it a
strong presumption of guilt.

Florida v. J.L. (2000)
529 U.S. 266

Majority: (unanimous,
Ginsburg)

NO

Concurrence: (Kennedy,
Rehnquist)

NO

Bond v. United States (2000)
529 U.S. 334
Majority: (Rehnquist, Stevens,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg)

NO

Dissent: (Breyer, Scalia)

NO

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000)
531 U.S. 32
Majority: (O’Connor, Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Rehnquist, Thomas,
Scalia [Part I])

NO

Makes mention that the Framers might not have
approved of the roadblock.
Dissent: (Thomas)

NOBOMC
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Illinois v. McArthur (2001)
531 U.S. 326
Majority: (Breyer, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg)

NO

Concurrence: (Souter)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens)

NOBOMC

References the centuries-old principle of respect
for the privacy of the home, but actually applies
the same nonoriginalist balancing test embraced
by the Court.

Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001)
532 U.S. 67
Majority: (Stevens, O’Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer)

NO

Concurrence: (Kennedy)

NO

Dissent: (Scalia, Rehnquist [Part
II], Thomas [Part II])

NO
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)
532 U.S. 318

Majority: (Souter, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas)

O

Coded primary issue: whether there is a breach
of the peace requirement for warrantless
misdemeanor arrests.

Dissent: (O’Connor, Stevens,
Ginsburg, Breyer)

NOBOMC

Notes that misdemeanor arrests were not the
subject of a clear and consistently applied rule at
common law. The dissent then employs a
nonoriginalist balancing test.

Kyllo v. United States (2001)
533 U.S. 27
Majority: (Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer)

Dissent: (Stevens, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Kennedy)

O

NO

Believes the Fourth Amendment should
preserve the privacy of the home recognized in
the Framing-era.
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United States v. Knights (2001)
534 U.S. 112
Majority: (unanimous,
Rehnquist)

NO

Concurrence: (Souter)

NO
United States v. Arvizu (2002)
534 U.S. 266

Majority: (unanimous,
Rehnquist)

Concurrence: (Scalia)

NO

NO
United States v. Drayton (2002)
536 U.S. 194

Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas,
Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg)

NO

Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County et al v. Earls
(2002)
536 U.S. 822
Majority: (Thomas, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer)

NO

Concurrence: (Breyer)

NO

Breyer joined the majority and wrote a
concurring opinion.

Dissent: (O’Connor, Souter)

NO

O’Connor and Souter joined both dissenting
opinions.

Dissent: (Ginsburg, Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter)

NO
United States v. Banks (2003)
540 U.S. 31

Majority: (Unanimous, Scalia)
NBMOC

Refers to common-law knock-and-announce
rule from Wilson v. Arkansas.
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Maryland v. Pringle (2003)
540 U.S. 366
Majority: (Unanimous,
Rehnquist)

NO

Illinois v. Lidster (2004)
540 U.S. 419
Majority: (Breyer, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas)

NO

Parts I and II: (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg)

Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined the
majority for Parts I and II, but together shared a
partial concurrence/dissent to the judgment.

Partial Concurrence/Dissent:
(Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg)
NO

Groh v. Ramirez (2004)
540 U.S. 551
Majority: (Stevens, O’Conner,
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Kennedy, Rehnquist)
NO

Dissent: (Thomas, Scalia)

Rehnquist joins Thomas dissent in
nonoriginalist Part III.

NOBOMC
Part III: (Rehnquist)

United States v. Flores-Montano (2004)
541 U.S. 149
Majority: (Unanimous,
Rehnquist)

O

Concurrence: (Breyer)
O

Unanimous opinion with Breyer concurrence.
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Thornton v. United States (2004)
541 U.S. 615
Majority: (Rehnquist, Kennedy,
Thomas, Breyer)

NO

O’Connor joined the majority for all but
footnote 4.

Sans Footnote 4: (O’Connor)
Concurrence: (O’Connor)

NO

Concurrence: (Scalia, Ginsburg)
NOBOMC

Dissent: (Stevens, Souter)
NO

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District (2004)
542 U.S. 177
Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas)

NOBOMC

Dissent: (Stevens)

Not coded

Only addresses Fifth Amendment issue.

Dissent: (Breyer, Souter,
Ginsburg)
NO

Devenpeck v. Alford (2004)
543 U.S. 146
(Sans Rehnquist)
Majority: (Unanimous, Scalia)

NO

Rehnquist took no part in this opinion.

Illinois v. Caballes (2004)
543 U.S. 405
(Sans Rehnquist)
Majority: (Stevens, O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Souter)
NO

Dissent: (Ginsburg, Souter)
NO

Rehnquist took no part in this opinion.
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Muehler v. Mena (2005)
544 U.S. 93
Majority: (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas)

NO

Concurrence: (Kennedy)

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer)

NO

United States v. Grubbs (2006)
547 U.S. 90
(Sans Alito)
Alito took no part in this opinion.
Majority: (Scalia, Roberts,
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer,
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg)

Concurrence: (Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg)

NO
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter joined as to Parts
I and II, but filed a separate concurrence.

NOBOMC

Cites to “the objectionable 18th century writs of
assistance” (Pp. 100) and equates the “start
date” of warrants as an established principle.

160

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:75

Georgia v. Randolph (2006)
547 U.S. 103
(Sans Alito)
Alito took no part in this opinion.
Majority: (Souter, Stevens,
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer)

NOBOMC
Cites to “ancient adage that a man’s house is his
castle.”

Concurrence: (Stevens)

NOBOMC

Concurrence: (Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Roberts, Scalia)

NO

Dissent: (Scalia)

Dissent: (Thomas)

Begins concurrence with a statement regarding
the necessity of considering historical evidence
and how it relates to our changing society, but
ultimately relies on the changes in society for
the reasoning behind the concurrence.

O

NO

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006)
547 U.S. 398
Majority: (Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
Thomas, Breyer, Alito)

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens)
NO
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Hudson v. Michigan (2006)
547 U.S. 586
Majority:
Parts I-III: (Scalia, Roberts,
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito)

NOBOMC

Identifies “common law principle” of knockand-announce as “ancient,” tracing its origin to
English law.

NOBOMC

First part of Kennedy’s concurrence discusses
the privacy protection represented by knockand-announce as “explained in our decisions
and as understood since the beginnings of the
Republic.” Consistently refers to knock-andannounce as an “ancient” principle.

Part IV: (Scalia, Roberts,
Thomas, Alito)

Concurrence: (Kennedy)

Dissent: (Breyer, Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg)

NOBOMC

Makes reference to “tracing the lineage of the
knock-and-announce rule” which dates “back to
the 13th century.” Dissent further elaborates on
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and
the meaning of reasonableness under this
standard.

Samson v. California (2006)
547 U.S. 843
Majority: (Thomas, Roberts,
Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
Alito)

Dissent: (Stevens, Souter,
Breyer)

NO

The dissent cites to the “pre-Revolutionary
‘writs of innocence’” of arbitrary contraband
searches and eventually cites to individualized
suspicion as “the shield the Framers selected to
guard against the evils of arbitrary action,
caprice, and harassment.”
O
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Scott v. Harris (2007)
550 U.S. 372
Majority: (Scalia, Roberts,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito)

NO

Concurrence: (Ginsburg)

NO

Concurrence: (Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Stevens)

NO
Brendlin v. California (2007)
551 U.S. 249

Majority: (Souter, Roberts,
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Thomas,
Breyer, Alito, Scalia, Stevens)

NOBOMC

The Court cites to Brower v. County of Inyo, a
case coded as originalist, stating that the test for
a seizure is found within this case.

Virginia v. Moore (2008)
553 U.S. 164

Majority: (Scalia, Roberts,
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Breyer, Alito)

NOBOMC

The Court “begins with history” in its analysis
of whether a search or seizure is unreasonable.
“When history has not provided a conclusive
answer,” the Court states, governmental
interests and privacy interests are weighed. Id.
at 171. This is ultimately the test used by the
Court for the facts of the case.

Concurrence: (Ginsburg)

NOBOMC

Ginsburg cites to the common law and
“historical record” but ultimately rests opinion
on belief that the arrest violated Virginia law,
but not the Constitution.

Herring v. United States (2009)
555 U.S. 135
Majority: (Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito)
NO

Breyer joined opinion pp. 704-710
Dissent: (Ginsburg, Stevens,
Souter, Breyer)

NOBOMC

Equates failure to maintain a database as akin to
“the use of general warrants that so outraged the
authors of our Bill of Rights.” (Pp. 156)

Dissent: (Breyer, Souter)

NOBOMC

Souter joined pp. 710-711
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Arizona v. Johnson (2009)
555 U.S. 323
Majority: (Ginsburg, Alito,
Breyer, Kennedy, Roberts,
Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Thomas)

Unanimous Ginsburg opinion.

NO

Arizona v. Gant (2009)
556 U.S. 332
Majority: (Stevens, Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg)
Concurrence: (Scalia)

NO

Entire case calls into question the rules of
Belton, Thornton, and Chimel.

NOBOMC

Finds historical evidence inconclusive

Dissent: (Breyer)

NO

Dissent: (Alito, Roberts,
Kennedy, Breyer)

NO

Breyer joined except Part II-E; Alito’s dissent
makes brief reference to Scalia’s concurrence in
Thornton, which is coded NOBOMC.

Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding (2009)
557 U.S. 364
Majority: (Souter, Roberts,
Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito)
NO
Partial (Parts I-III): (Stevens,
Ginsburg)
Partial Concurrence/Dissent:
(Stevens, Ginsburg)

NO

Partial Concurrence/Dissent:
(Thomas)

O

Thomas cites to common law doctrine of in loco
parentis.

City of Ontario v. Quon (2010)
560 U.S. 746
Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts,
Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor)

NO

Concurrence: (Stevens)
NO
Concurrence: (Scalia)
NO
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Kentucky v. King (2011)
563 U.S. 452
Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer,
Sotomayor, Kagan)

NO

Dissent: (Ginsburg)

NO
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd (2011)
563 U.S. 731
Kagan took no part in this opinion.

Majority: (Scalia, Roberts,
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito)

NOBOMC

Concurrence: (Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor)

NO

Concurrence: (Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor)

NO

Concurrence: (Sotomayor,
Ginsburg, Breyer)

NO

Cites to the “historical assertions” of the Court
of Appeals, stating that “[t]he Fourth
Amendment was a response to the English
Crown’s use of general warrants, which often
allowed royal officials to search and seize
whatever and whomever they pleased while
investigating crimes or affronts to the Crown.”
The Court later states, “The principal evil of the
general warrant was addressed by the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement.”

Davis v. United States (2011)
564 U.S. 229

Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Kagan)

NO

Concurrence: (Sotomayor)

NO

Dissent: (Breyer, Ginsburg)

NO
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United States v. Jones (2012)
565 U.S. 400

Majority: (Scalia, Roberts,
Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor)

O

Concurrence: (Sotomayor)

O

The Court concludes its opinion with, “We have
no doubt that such a physical intrusion would
have been considered a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was
adopted.”

Alito discusses the Court’s use of “18th-century
tort law” relating to trespass to chattels and later
says that “it is almost impossible to think of
late-18th century situations that are analogous to
what took place in this case.”
Concurrence: (Alito, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Kagan)

NOBOMC
Alito acknowledges the importance of
considering the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment at its inception, but does not think
it entirely representative of the violation in this
case.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington (2012)
566 U.S. 318
Kennedy wrote all but Part IV.
Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts,
Scalia, Alito, Thomas)

NO

Roberts, Scalia, Alito joined in full.
Thomas joined all but Part IV.

Concurrence: (Roberts)

NO

Concurrence: (Alito)

NO

Dissent: (Breyer, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Kagan)

NO
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Bailey v. United States (2013)
568 U.S. 186
Court applies the “immediate vicinity” rule of
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 and
determines that it does not apply to the facts of
this case.
Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts,
Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
Kagan)

Concurrence: (Scalia, Ginsburg,
Kagan)

NOBOMC
Michigan v. Summers is coded NOBOMC.

NOBOMC

P. 1044 quotes Dunaway v. New York regarding
the concept that the Fourth Amendment
“protections intended by the Framers could all
too easily disappear in the consideration and
balancing of the multifarious circumstances
presented by different causes.”

Dissent: (Breyer, Thomas, Alito)

NOBOMC

Florida v. Harris (2013)
568 U.S. 237
Majority: (Kagan)
Unanimous Court

NO
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Florida v. Jardines (2013)
569 U.S. 1
Section II makes reference to the Amendment’s
“simple baseline” of protection covering the
government’s physical intrusion onto private
property.

Majority: (Scalia, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan)

Section II-A, states that curtilage (specifically
open fields) are excluded from Fourth
Amendment protection “because such fields are
not enumerated in the Amendment’s text.”

O

Ultimately, because the government physically
entered Jardines’ home and the surrounding
area, their activity constituted a search.
Concurrence: (Kagan, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor)

Dissent: (Alito, Roberts,
Kennedy, Breyer)

O

NOBOMC

Makes repeated references to domestication of
dogs being a centuries-old concept and that the
use of dogs for investigative purposes is old
enough to have been considered by the Framers,
but it was not included.

Missouri v. McNeely (2013)
569 U.S. 141
Majority: (Sotomayor)
Parts I, II-A, II-B, and IV:
(Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
Kagan)

NO

Parts II-C and III: (Scalia,
Ginsburg, Kagan)
Concurrence: (Kennedy)

Concurrence/Dissent: (Roberts,
Breyer, Alito)

NO

NO

Dissent: (Thomas)
NO

168

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:75

Maryland v. King (2013)
569 U.S. 435

Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts,
Thomas, Breyer, Alito)

Dissent: (Scalia, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Kagan)

NOBOMC

NOBOMC

Part IV-A states, “Also uncontested is the ‘right
on the part of the Government, always
recognized under English and American law, to
search the person of the accused when legally
arrested … ‘The validity of the search of a
person incident to a lawful arrest has been
regarded as settled from the first enunciation,
and has remained virtually unchallenged.”
Part I-A states, “At the time of the Founding,
Americans despised the British use of so-called
‘general warrants’—warrants not grounded
upon a sworn oath of a specific infraction by a
particular individual, and thus not limited in
scope and application.”
Paragraph continues to cite other evidence
relating to the concept of general warrants.
Ultimately, the intrusion on the person as an
explicit violation of the Fourth Amendment is
the reasoning behind this opinion.

Fernandez v. California (2014)
571 U.S. 292
Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer)

Concurrence: (Scalia)

NO

O

Cites to the “traditional property-based
understanding of the Fourth Amendment”
(quoting United States v. Jones) and uses it to
assess whether a violation occurred in this case.

Concurrence: (Thomas)
NOBOMC

Dissent: (Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
Kagan)

NOBOMC

P. 317 discusses the neutral magistrate’s role in
warrant distribution; “Because the Framers saw
the neutral magistrate as shielding all of us,
good or bad, saint or sinner, from unchecked
police activity. . . .” and later says: “‘But the
Fourth Amendment’ the Court has long
recognized, ‘reflects the view of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a
person’s home and property may not be totally
sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in
enforcement of criminal law.”
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Navarette v. California (2014)
572 U.S. 393
Majority: (Thomas, Roberts,
Kennedy, Breyer, Alito)

Dissent: (Scalia, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Kagan)

NO

NOBOMC

In regard to anonymous calls becoming
legitimate tips as long as the caller can identify
his location, Scalia says, “This is not my
concept, and I am sure would not be the
Framers’, of a people secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures.” (P. 405).

Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014)
134 S. Ct. 2012
Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor,
Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer)

Ginsburg joined as to Parts I, II, and III-C.
NO
Breyer joined all except Part III-B-2.
Riley v. California (2014)
134 S. Ct. 2473
Discusses technological advancement re: cell
phone use and concept of adopting procedures
for law enforcement. The Court says of these
protocols, “Probably a good idea, but the
Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the
right to government agency protocols.” (P.
2491)

Majority: (Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)

NOBOMC

Opinion also discusses the general warrants and
writs of assistance of the colonial era and
considers them as an analogy to the proposed
compulsory procedures of forcing a citizen to
surrender his phone and/or the information
contained within it.

Ultimately, the Court decides that the privacy
interest in a cell phone was greater than a
Founding-era argument.

Concurrence: (Alito)

NOBOMC

Cites to the “well-established . . . mideighteenth century” principle of search incident
to arrest. Footnote on P. 2496 makes reference
to searches of a person in the colonial era
including “not only his surface clothing but his
body, luggage, and saddlebags.”
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Heien v. North Carolina (2014)
135 S. Ct. 530
Majority: (Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Alito, Kagan)

NO

Concurrence: (Kagan, Ginsburg)

NO

Dissent: (Sotomayor)

NO
Rodriguez v. United States (2015)
135 S. Ct. 1609

Majority: (Ginsburg, Roberts,
Scalia, Breyer, Sotomayor,
Kagan)

NO

Dissent: (Kennedy)

NO

Kennedy joined all but Part III.

Part I states:

Dissent: (Thomas, Alito,
Kennedy)

NOBOMC

Dissent: (Alito)

NOBOMC

We have defied reasonableness “in objective
terms by examining the totality of the
circumstances,” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,
39 (1996), and by considering “the traditional
protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures afforded by the common law at the time
of the framing,” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 326 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). When traditional protections have not
provided a definitive answer, our precedents
have “analyzed a search or seizure in light of
traditional standards of reasonableness by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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City of Los Angeles v. Patel (2015)
135 S. Ct. 2443
Majority: (Sotomayor, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan)

NOBOMC

Dissent: (Scalia, Roberts,
Thomas)

Part II discusses textual interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.
NOBOMC

Dissent: (Alito, Thomas)

Cites to “An Act For The Due Regulation Of
Licensed Houses (1786)” which raises the point
that hotels have been historically treated as
public accommodations.

NO

Part II-A elaborates on the majority’s point re:
hotels as public accommodations and cites to
Blackstone’s “Commentaries on the Laws of
England 168 (1765).

172

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

***

[Vol. 70:75

